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The People's Republic of China (PRC/中華人民共和國）has used several 
different methods to deal with the changes that have occurred on Taiwan as a 
result of Taiwan's democratization. This democratization along with the 
formation of a distinct Taiwanese identity have enhanced the desire of many 
Taiwanese to achieve de jure independence. 
In light of events that have occurred on Taiwan, as well as for internal 
political reasons, Chinese leaders have felt the need to warn and remind the 
Taiwanese people and government that if they intend to pursue dejure 
independence, the PRC is willing to use force to enforce its claim over Taiwan. 
However, in warning Taiwan in the past, the PRC has only pushed the 
Taiwanese people more into the camp of the pro-independence Taiwanese. Due 
to the transfer of power to a new generation of Chinese leaders, and Taiwanese 
moves that the PRC has deemed unacceptable (election of Democratic 
Progressive Party (DPP/ 民進黨)leaders, talk of changing the constitution) the 
PRC needed to act. It was necessary for the PRC to change its strategy and warn 
Taiwan without inciting a backlash. 
This thesis argues that the Anti-Secession Law (反分裂國家法）which was 
passed by the PRC and the subsequent KMT (Guomindang/國民黨)-PRC talks 
since the passage of the Law signify a new PRC strategy in dealing with cross-
strait relations. 
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I 
Introduction 
Secession is an idea is at the very heart of the Anti-Secession Law (ASL/反 
分裂國家法"fanfenlieguojiafa"). The ASL was created and passed by the People's 
Republic of China (PRC) in March of 2005 to prevent the so-called secession of 
z 
Taiwan. However, one must consider exactly what secession is. At the heart of 
understanding this issue there are two important questions: What is Taiwan? 
And who are the People on Taiwan? These questions must be answered in order 
to determine whether or not Taiwan can "secede" from the People's Republic of 
China. Taiwan cannot truly "secede" from something it is not a part of. 
Assuming that Taiwan is a part of something that it can secede from, the answer 
to these questions could also be helpful in understanding whether or not Taiwan 
has a right to secede. 
Taiwan maintains official diplomatic relations with only a handful of 
states throughout the world, while China enjoys membership in many 
international organizations. Organizations which require sovereignty as a 
prerequisite for entrance typically do not allow Taiwan's participation as a 
sovereign country. At times the PRC has allowed Taiwan participation in certain 
international events but it only allows it under the pretext that Taiwan is a part 
of "China". It should be noted that Beijing has also allowed Hong Kong to 
participate in certain international events that usually require sovereignty. 
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therefore allowing Taiwan to participate in some events does not necessarily 
mean Beijing recognizes Taiwan as being a sovereign state. 
To the PRC, Taiwan is a renegade province and the Taiwan issue is an 
element of the Chinese Civil War that remains unresolved. It claims that Taiwan 
is an inalienable part of Chinese territory and therefore affairs between the PRC 
and Taiwan are internal "Chinese" matters. To the Taiwanese, Taiwan can be 
defined in a number of ways. The name of the political entity that exercises de 
facto sovereignty over Taiwan today is the Republic of China (ROC). 
Constitutionally, the ROC still claims to be the legitimate government of China 
proper as well as of Taiwan. In this sense, one can conclude that at least legally, 
the governments in both Taipei and Beijing agree that Taiwan is indeed a part of 
a larger entity that encompasses Mainland China and Taiwan. For decades the 
governments on both sides of the Taiwan Strait retained the goal of regaining 
sovereignty over the other side. 
However, in recent decades the issue of whether or not Taiwan is a part of 
a "greater China" has become a point of contention. Related to this issue is the 
concept of Taiwanese identity. Along with the formation of a Taiwanese identity, 
a distinct identity that has gradually formed since the late century, has come 
an increased desire for Taiwan Independence. Many Taiwanese now feel that 
Taiwan is not a part of greater China but in fact an independent state. Taiwan's 
3 
vice-president, Annette Lu has claimed that Taiwan already possesses de jure 
independence and is not a part of China.� 
The question of whether or not Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese 
territory is relevant to the issue of whether or not Taiwan can in fact be a 
secessionist state. The People's Republic of China has never held any de facto 
sovereignty over Taiwan. The people of Taiwan carry Republic of China 
passports, they have their own military, and they elect their own government. 
This government has never been answerable to Beijing in terms of its ability to 
run Taiwan. The fact that Taiwan has never been under PRC authority at all 
could make the claim that Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory-
untenable. It would additionally make illegitimate any Chinese claims that if it 
should choose to attack Taiwan it would be justified because China would be 
protecting its territorial integrity. Regardless of whether one takes the view that 
Taiwan is a territory of the PRC or has the right to dejure independence, the fact 
that the PRC claims Taiwan and states that it is willing to back that claim up with 
force if necessary makes the PRC's claim over Taiwan a political reality that must 
be contended with. The PRCs military budget grows year after year^. The PRC is 
also the world's most populous country and one of five permanent members of 
the United Nations Security Council. Thus, when China claims a territory that is 
^From a 2000 interview with Time Asia with Annette Lu. 
http://www.time.com/time/asia/features/interviews/int.aimlu.html 
^"China's Defense Budget" from GlobalSecurity.org 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/biidget.htm 
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as geographically close as Taiwan, it is difficult to disregard China's claim simply 
by using legal arguments. However, it is important to note that much of China's 
claim over Taiwan rests on historical and cultural concerns. 
Another idea that relates to China's claim over Taiwan has to do with the 
people on Taiwan. There have been scholars who have defended the PRC's claim 
to Taiwan on the grounds that not only does the Taiwan conflict relate back to 
the Chinese Civil War, but also that the people on Taiwan are Chinese, and that 
this supports China's claim. However, the people on Taiwan have had a different 
historical experience from the people on the Mainland. 
It is important to recognize that there are subtle differences in the Chinese 
language that simply do not translate into English. These differences allow for 
people to more easily differentiate between being ethnically Chinese and having 
Chinese nationality . While many people on Taiwan may identify as being "hua 
r饥"(華人）they may not identify as being "zhong guo 中國人)• "Hua ren" can 
be defined as a person who is ethnically Chinese but was bom or holds 
citizenship outside of China, "zhong guo ren" literally means "China person" and 
refers to someone from China. In this way, Taiwanese and overseas Chinese can 
identify themselves as being "Chinese" but not Chinese from China. 
Singaporeans (Chinese) make use of the word to describe the language 
that they speak, which is essentially a form of Mandarin. These subtleties of 
language reflect the fact that many Taiwanese may have multiple identities. They 
may consider themselves to be both Chinese and Taiwanese. 
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It cannot be doubted that the vast majority of people in Taiwan have a 
cultural and ancestral link to the Mainland. It also cannot be doubted that 
Taiwan and the Mainland have a connection that dates back to centuries ago. 
However, exactly what Taiwan's political status really should be, is a question 
that still remains difficult to answer and will be answered differently depending 
on who is asked. 
Chapter one of this thesis will consist of a history of Taiwan. It will also 
review important historical factors that have led to the creation of a distinct 
Taiwanese identity. Chapter two will be a literature review. In that chapter I will 
review research done on the topic of secession, the ASL, and Taiwanese politics 
and identity. Chapters three and four will concern the US which is very much 
involved in Taiwan's history and the current situation there. Chapter three will 
cover the current state of Sino-US relations and chapter four will consist of a 
history of the US security commitment to Taiwan. 
Chapter five will consist of a review of the ASL. In that chapter I will 
break down the ten clauses of the ASL and discuss their significance. Chapter six 
will discuss why the ASL was passed by the PRC. I will examine the reasons 
behind the passage of the ASL from a historical perspective. Chapter seven will 
be an analysis of events that occurred in relation to or as a result of the ASL. 
Chapter eight will consist of a short conclusion. 
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Chapter One: The Formation of a Taiwanese Identity 
In a thesis such as this one, which deals with issues involving the 
triangular relationship between the U.S., the PRC and Taiwan, a background 
history of the cross-strait situation should be included. The reason for this 
inclusion is that history is at the heart of the cross-strait conflict. One of the main 
reasons the PRC desires to reclaim Taiwan has to do with the desire to overcome 
historical injustices inflicted upon China at the hands of foreign powers. 
Furthermore, the A5L itself relates the oiirent situation to the Chinese civil war. 
To the PRC, the current issue is an unresolved historical issue dating back to 
when the KMT fled to Taiwan after losing the Mainland and the US proceeded to 
place Taiwan under its protection. Additionally, in order to examine legal issues 
pertaining to claims over Taiwan it is important to examine the historical events 
that led up to the current situation, as well as the political motives of the 
countries involved. The other relevant factor is the history of a Taiwan identity. 
The formation of a Taiwanese identity has been a key factor throughout the 
process of Taiwan's democratization. 
Pre-Putch Occupation 
Taiwan was originally inhabited by people who were not of the Han (漢族， 
the ethnic group which currently accounts for the majority of people in the PRC) 
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ethnic group. These inhabitants of Taiwan were people of Malayo-Polynesian 
tribes^. The native Taiwanese lived in a tribal society where different tribes 
competed for dominance and hunting grounds. On the Western side of Taiwan, 
there were a few settlers from the Mainland. These people mostly consisted of 
merchants, people evading taxes on the Mainland as well as those escaping 
poverty. 
The Dutch Occupation 
Early in the 17th century Taiwan's history began to change. "Taiwan in 
1600 was on the outer edge of Chinese consciousness and activity, with little or 
no permanent Chinese settlement, visited only by fishermen, smugglers, and 
pirates, and only dimly reflected in the discussions and records of the officials 
who administered and patrolled the South China Coast...In the course of the 
seventeenth century, maritime Chinese, Japanese, Spanish, English^ and Dutch 
warriors and traders all sought to settle on the great island, make it a commercial 
base, and profit from its riches."^ Many people (Mostly Non-Chinese) referred to 
Taiwan as "Formosa"(美麗島）after it was given the name by Portuguese during 
the 16^ century. The first foreign power to establish a significant presence in 
3 Murray A. Rubinstein (ed.) Taiwan: A New History, Armonk, New York, M. E. 
Sharpe, 1999. 
4 John E. Wills Jr. "The Seventeenth Century Transformation: Taiwan Under the 
Dutch and the Cheng Regime,, from Rubinstein, Murray A.(ed.) Taiwan: A New 
History, Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe 1999 p.85. 
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Taiwan was the Dutch. Taiwan was not the their first choice for colonization. The 
Dutch went to Taiwan after suffering defeat at Macau^ and subsequently being 
forced off Penghu (彰湖）by the Chinese. The intentions of the Dutch were to find 
a suitable trading post as well as a base from which to fight its enemies. In 1624 
the Dutch built Fort Zeelandia near Tainan. Additionally during the 1620s Spain 
tried to build outposts at the north end of Taiwan but ultimately failed. While the 
Dutch presence on the island was short-lived, it represented the first serious 
effort to develop Taiwan. "Establishing a government over much of the island, 
the Dutch organized labor, created mines and plantations, and introduced new 
crops and tools. Dutch administration and infrastructure facilitated trade as well 
as the immigration of more Chinese to Taiwan...The island became a profitable 
operation for the Dutch East India Company. Taiwan exported dried fish and 
deer meat to China and sugar and deerskins to Japan, while the Dutch 
administration collected taxes from Taiwan's residents". ^ At times the 
relationship between the Dutch and the aboriginals was cooperative and at times 
it was relatively hostile. The Dutch were forced off Taiwan in 1661 when Taiwan 
was made the base of operations by Coxinga (鄭成功 ’ 1624^1662), a Miag (明 
朝）loyalist. 
5 Rev, WM Campbell. Formosa Under The Dutch. Taipei: Ch'eng-Wen Publishing 
Company, 1967. 
6 Denny Roy, Taiwan, A Political History. Ithaca and London: Cornell University 
Press, 2003 p. 15. 
9 
The beginning of Chinese rule on Taiwan was connected to events that 
occurred following the fall of the Ming dynasty. The Ming loyalist Coxinga was 
forced to find a refuge outside of Mainland China when in 1662 the Qing (淸 
朝 ) d e c r e e d that all the coastal regions from Shandong (山東）to Guangdong (廣 
東)were to be evacuated. In 1661 Coxinga attacked the Dutch on Taiwan and 
was successful in forcing them out by 1662. Coxinga was able to bring some 
elements of Chinese culture with him to Taiwan. "With the exodus of the Dutch 
in 1662, Koxinga [Coxinga] became sovereign of Formosa, and Ming dynasty rule 
was locally prolonged under his reign. His policies brought to Formosa certain 
Chinese laws, customs, institutions of government, and something of the 
prosperity and enlightenment of China to the inhabitants/'^Coxinga died in 1662, 
shortly after establishing his control over Taiwan. Following his death, Coxinga 
was succeeded by his son Zheng Jing(鄭經).Zheng Jing supported the rebellion 
on the Mainland against the Qing dynasty that was being led by the Governor-
General of Fujian(福建).Zheng Jing was able to hold Taiwan until the year 1683 
when the Qing sent a large expedition to Taiwan and successfully annexed i t , 
Taiwan became a prefecture of Fujian province. During the period of Coxinga's 
familial rule from 1662 to Qing annexation, Taiwan was settled by over 100,000 
ethnic Chinese.^ 
7 George Williams Carrington, Foreigners in Formosa 1841-1874. San Francisco: 
Chinese Materials Center Inc., 1977 p. 7. 
8 Jacques Gernet. A History Of Chinese Civilization, pp. 470-471. 
9 Patricia Buckley Ebrey. The Cambridge Illustrated History of China, p. 227. 
10 
Taiwan and the Japanese 
For many years China enjoyed stability while under the rule of the Qing 
dynasty, particularly because the Qing emperors generally had longer reigns 
than their Ming predecessors. However, in the 19伍 century China began to feel 
the effects of colonialism. The 19^ century saw the defeat of China at the hands 
of the British with the Opium Wars (鶴片戰爭）.This century also saw China 
being forced to open up and sign unequal treaties with foreign powers. Hong 
Kong was ceded to the British, and foreign concessions existed in a number of 
Chinese cities including Shanghai. Many foreign citizens enjoyed 
extraterritoriality in China. This meant that they were not subject to the Chinese 
legal system when they committed crimes. 
China had discovered that the Japanese succeeded in modernizing in 
areas where China had failed to do so, and the Japanese subsequently became a 
threat. Japan was capable of defending itself against western powers and began 
becoming an imperial power itself. Adding to this humiliation for China was its 
defeat at the hands of the Japanese in the first Sino-Japanese war (中日甲午戰爭） 
of 1894-1895. After both China and Japan sent forces to deal with a rebellion in 
Korea, Japan sank a Chinese ship igniting tensions that produced a war between 
China and Japan, The Chinese Navy did not have much success against its 
Japanese counterpart and China was forced to negotiate for peace. Under the 
terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which was effective in 1895, China agreed to 
11 
a large indemnity and to the permanent cession of Taiwan and the Penghu 
Islands to Japan. 
After this agreement, China dispatched a message to Taiwan informing 
the Chinese officials that they must leave. However, some of these officials 
decided to mount a resistance to Japanese rule. They felt as if China had sold 
them out to the Japanese, and these Taiwanese decided to declare independence 
in May of 1895. The Chinese officials sought help from western powers and 
asked the British to take control of Taiwan. However, at that time the western 
powers actually preferred a Japanese occupation of Taiwan in hopes that such an 
occupation would bring both development and stability to Taiwan and its 
surrounding waters. The resistance to the Japanese was short-lived and in 
October, 1895 the Japanese captured Tainan, marking the official end of the 
resistance campaign. It should be noted that there were some anti-Japanese 
guerilla campaigns which continued until 1902. 
When the Japanese first began their rule over Taiwan, they offered all 
ethnic Chinese the opportunity to leave Taiwan for the Mainland to avoid 
becoming Japanese citizens. About one quarter of Taiwan's population left. 
However, many chose to remain on Taiwan, partly because they felt that their 
livelihood would be better guarded under Japanese occupied Taiwan than on the 
Mainland being ruled by an ailing Qing dynasty, i�Japanese rule continued on 
Denny Roy. Taiwan, A Political History. Cornell University Press: Ithaca and 
London 2003 pp. 34-35. 
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Taiwan until the end of World War 11. During World War II the allies had met at 
Cairo in the year 1943 and decided that upon the conclusion of World War II 
Taiwan would be returned to China (The government of "China" was not 
specified). In 1951, Japan signed a peace agreement with the Republic of China 
on Taiwan and officially renounced any territorial claim over the island. These 
treaties made it clear that Japan no longer claimed Taiwan, and the issue was left 
unsettled. 
World War II ended in 1945 after the Americans dropped the atomic bomb 
twice over Japan. The ending of the war meant that Japanese-occupied territory 
was to be returned. As discussed above, during the war, the Cairo declaration 
was signed in 1943. The allies, including the US and Britain agreed that Taiwan 
and some other areas occupied by the Japanese during World War II should be 
given over to the Republic Of China upon the defeat of Japan. The ending of the 
war came much more quickly than had been anticipated by those in China. The 
end of the war did not bring a calm. Instead it created a complicated situation in 
which both the KMT and CCP would quickly vie for territory and power. On the 
KMT side Chiang Kai-shek utilized American aid in order to occupy some areas 
that were formerly held by Japan in order keep rival warlords from seizing them. 
American transport planes help airlift troops to big cities like Shanghai and 
Nanjing. The Seventh Fleet also helped move troops. Over the course of several 
months Chiang was able to neutralize the few potentially competitive warlords. 
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However, the CCP was able to take advantage of the support of the Soviet 
Union. With that help, the CCP was able to move its troops into Manchuria and 
secure control over the area. Chiang Kai-shek used some of the previously 
surrendered Japanese forces to retake some lands lost to the Communists. “ This 
move had both positive and negative consequences for Chiang, The positive 
consequence was that he was able to gain land. On the other hand Chiang hurt 
his credibility with the Chinese people. "By this use of former enemies and 
traitors against his own countrymen, Chiang deprived the Communists of 
territory but tarnished the reputation of his regime. Even greater damage to its 
good name was done when the nationalists finally arrived in the territories 
formerly occupied by the Japanese, for they continued to employ Chinese puppet 
officials and police, thereby souring the joy of liberation. The bewilderment of 
the liberated was compounded by the attitudes of the Nationalist officials, who 
descended like locusts upon the occupied areas displaying sanctimonious 
arrogance, venality and corruption...By contrast, the Communists maintained 
moderate fiscal and social policies to consolidate and expand support in the 
territories still under their controL"i2 There was a brief calm before the storm 
when Chiang, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai met in Chongqing in August of 1945 
and initially agreed on a plan to unite the military and form a coalition 
government. These negotiations did not produce any fruitful results and 
E.R. Hooton. The Greatest Tumult: The Chinese Civil War, 1936-49. London: 
Brassey's(UK) 1991 p. 18. 
12 ibid. 
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ultimately Mao and Zhou returned to Yenan with Mao convinced that the only 
way out of the impasse was through a military solution. 
The beginning of the major fighting in 1945 saw the Nationalists regain 
most of their major cities. However, the Nationalists quickly saw defeat in battles 
where they had numerical advantage. The Communists were able to gain and 
maintain control of Manchuria. A few Nationalist expeditions to the north ended 
in failure. Both the CCP and the KMT had their weaknesses and internal 
problems. 
The course of the next three years saw the KMT defeated at the hands of 
the Communist Party. This defeat can be explained by a number of factors. It was 
during the months following the surrender of the Japanese that the public image 
of the KMT began to change. After the war, many of the cities that had come 
under Japanese control reverted to KMT authority. The officials who went to the 
cities were both incompetent and corrupt. "The sense of public disillusionment 
was greater because the incompetence and corruption came from a government 
that had stood for eight years as the symbol of the nation's will to 
survive"i3There was public criticism concerning some important issues: the 
slowness in disarming the Japanese, the reluctance to punish collaborators, the 
corruption of officials sent to take over Japanese and puppet properties and 
organizations by the KMT government, the inadequacy of the economic 
13 Pepper, Suzanne. Civil War In China. Maryland and Oxford: Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishers, 1999. p. 9. 
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measures that were implemented at the time, and finally the condescension 
displayed by the KMT officials when they viewed the population who had lived 
under the Japanese rather than retreat inland with the KMT.^^ 
There were other matters that led to the CCP victory. The CCP was more 
successful than the KMT in garnering public support for its cause. The CCP 
expanded from having 1.2 million members in 1945, to having 4.5 million 
members by late 1949�5. The CCP was expanding during that period and was 
also successful in wooing minority parties such as the Kuomintang 
Revolutionary League, the Democratic League, and the Chinese People's 
Salvation Association. Along with this popular support enjoyed by the CCP, it 
also achieved victory through its military tactics. In July 1947, the Communists 
launched their first major counter-attack against the KMT forces. The CCP was 
soon able to threaten areas around the Yangzi river. Although Lin Biao wanted 
to quickly attack and remove KMT strongholds in Northern China, Mao 
Zedong decided to hold off. The line of reasoning Mao used was that he did not 
want the KMT to move all its forces to the south. His fear was that KMT would 
move southward and be able to fortify and hold the area. His goal was to defeat 
the KMT forces and demoralize them rather than simply to seize territory. In late 
1948, the CCP attacked the city of Suzhou(蘇州).The KMT attempted to defend 
the city, and during the battle lost hundreds of thousands of troops. In December 
14 ibid. 
Elegant, Robert S. Mw Vs. Chiang: The Battlefar China, 1925-1949. pp. 135-137. 
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1948 Mao gave the order to attack Beijing. The CCP forces were able to encircle 
the KMT troops defending Beijing. They were also able to negotiate an end of 
hostilities with the KMT general who was the commander of the troops in the 
Beijing area. 
By the end of January, 1949, the CCP was in control of Northern China. 
During the period from September 1948 to January 1949 the KMT lost around 1.5 
million troops due to combat losses and desertion. While resistance while still 
theoretically possible at that point, the effects of demoralization had taken their 
toll on the KMT. Chiang was forced to resign his position as President and some 
KMT generals began to negotiate with the CPP. The KMT government fled to 
Chongqing. After resuming his presidency, Chiang ordered the KMT 
government to retreat to the island of T a i w a n . ^ ^ 
Following the end of the Chinese civil war, Chiang Kai Shek was forced to 
deal with governing only Taiwan. His arrival on Taiwan followed a period of 
discord between the KMT members who were on Taiwan before 1949, and the 
local Taiwanese. Those incidents and their effects will be discussed shortly. 
Additionally, in a later chapter I cover the issue of how and when Chiang was 
able to secure US protection and an American security commitment to Taiwan. 
While still on the Mainland, Chiang had realized that the KMT was in need of 
reform. However, due to the fact that the KMT was involved in the civil war, 
these reforms were postponed. After his arrival in Taiwan, Chiang again thought 
16 ibid, 139. 
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about reforms. He had concluded that the loss to the CCP was not due to military 
superiority but rather to their superior organizational p o w e r . � 7 
Eliminating factionalism and building a strong party 
organization were the first steps towards the KMT's goal of defeating 
the CCP and retaking the mainland. This was the primary focus of 
strategy; most of the work of the Party's planning commission dealt 
with policies to be enacted after retaking the Mainland. A secondary, 
but more immediate, task was governing the island of Taiwan.^ ® 
While on the Mainland, Chiang Kai Shek was unwilling to change his 
strategy of dealing with, the Japanese, even while the Americans urged him. In 
order to create a better situation on Taiwan, many reforms were implemented. 
These reforms not only included the KMT party itself, but also issues such as 
land distribution. Rent reduction and land-to-the-tiller policies had the effect of 
increasing agricultural production and removing the Taiwanese elites from their 
source of wealth. By removing these elites, the KMT created a power vacuum. 
This power vacuum was then filled by local factions that could be co-opted into 
the KMT. The reorganization campaign by Chiang had six broad goals. These 
17 Bruce J. Dickson. "The Lessons of Defeat: The Reorganization of the 
Kuomintang on Taiwan, 1950-1952." The China Quarterly, No. 133 March 1993 pp. 
56-84. 
18 Ibid. 62 
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goals were to make the KMT a revolutionary-democratic party, to broaden the 
party's social base by the inclusion of peasants, workers, youth, intellectuals, and 
producers, the adoption of democratic centralism as an organizing principle, to 
emphasize party cells as the basic unit of the party, to have all decisions made by 
the party's committees and personnel as well as other matters handled through 
formal procedures, and to "insist that Party members obey the Party, uphold its 
policies, and have a proper work style" .i9 
The KMT and the Formation of a Taiwanese Identity 
KMT rule on Taiwan, before and after Chiang's retreat to Taiwan had a 
profound impact on the Taiwanese identity. When Chiang retreated to Taiwan it 
was not just himself that made the retreat. Approximately a million and a half 
people made the trip to Taiwan around the same time. There were important 
contrasts between these Mainlanders and the Taiwanese that had been been 
living on Taiwan since before the war with the Japanese. These groups had 
distinct experiences during the period of the Japanese occupation of Taiwan. At 
that time, the Mainlanders had only recently concluded a major war against the 
Japanese, in which many Chinese had suffered greatly. Many people retained the 
memories of Japanese brutality when they went over to Taiwan. When they went 
to Taiwan, they found that large elements of Japanese influence still existed 
19 Ibid. 65. 
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throughout Taiwanese society. As Denny Roy wrote "The Mainland's 
determination to regain Taiwan did not necessarily imply acceptance of Taiwan's 
people as full-fledged compatriots...In the minds of the Mainlanders, therefore, 
the most salient feature of the Japanese occupation of Taiwan was the systematic 
effort by the colonial authorities to turn the hearts and minds of Taiwanese 
against China/'^oAdditionally, the Taiwanese were recruited as Japanese agents 
before the war. When they would enter China on behalf of the Japanese, they 
enjoyed Japanese extraterritoriality rights. This worked to create resentment 
against the Taiwanese in communities where they worked. According to Roy, the 
Mainlanders who moved over to Taiwan had a superiority complex. 
This superiority complex was not restricted to the Mainlanders. The 
Taiwanese also had a superiority complex. While the Mainlanders were dealing 
with civil strife and fighting the Japanese, the Taiwanese were under Japanese 
occupation. Although the Taiwanese were under Japanese rule, their society 
advanced in a number of ways. As Roy continues, "While they resented the 
discrimination and restrictions on their political power that were part of the 
Japanese occupation, many Taiwanese also believed Japanese rule had helped 
Taiwan advance economically, politically, and socially relative to the backward, 
chaotic, Mainland/'2i 
20Denny Roy, Taiwan, A Political History p. 56 
21 ibid. pp. 56-57 
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The period of Japanese rule on Taiwan was also a very crucial element in 
the creation of a Taiwanese identity. According to Maurice Meisner, Japanese 
rule transformed Taiwanese society and made it more conducive to forming a 
national identity. The involvement of Taiwanese farmers in a market economy as 
well as the movement of people from rural environments to cities "tended to 
undermine traditional localistic loyalties". 二 This move to the urban areas along 
with Taiwanese engaging in non-traditional occupations led to the rise of a small 
middk class. There was also a middle class that developed outside the cities. 
This middle class consisted of teachers, physicians, as well as businessman who 
lived in towns with populations of about 20,000. "As intermediaries between the 
economic and intellectual life of cities and the rural areas the members of this 
middle class played crucial roles in promoting a common Formosan sense of 
identity. Thus the two factors that been most often associated with the rise of 
modern nationalisms- the weakening of the colder communal and localistic 
loyalties and the rise of a middle class- appeared at least in embryo in Formosa 
during the period of Japanese r u l e " .23 
The KMT that came over from the Mainland contributed to this formation 
of a Taiwanese identity through their treatment of the Taiwanese upon their 
arrival. A small incident between a police officer and a woman who was selling 
cigarettes resulted in a riot and the destruction of a police station. Murray A. 
22 Maurice Meisner. "The Development of Formosan Nationalism." The China 
Quarterly, No. 15 Jul.-Sept. 1963. 
23 ibid. 
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Rubinstein wrote, "Once word of the attack on the police station had circulated, 
the fighting spread throughout the island and the Nationalist authorities were 
soon forced to defend themselves...As the Nationalist authorities negotiated 
with the Taiwanese leaders, seemingly in good faith, they brought troops from 
the Chinese mainland. These troops restored order and made numerous arrests; 
many of those arrested died in captivity and there was great bloodshed/'^^The 
death toll has been estimated to be at least 10,000.25 This incident that occurred 
on February of 1947 provided an opportunity to the KMT. The KMT was 
able to wipe out many Taiwanese elites that were educated under the Japanese. 
These were people that would have had the ability to challenge the KMT's 
control, Rubinstein continues; "Taiwan was now pacified, and its elites and its 
general populace would remain docile- with certain notable exceptions- until 
the early 1970s. However, the memory of the violence was kept alive in the 
minds of those who witnessed it and experienced its fury. The bitterness of that 
repression remains to this day". Leaders of some movements, like the 
Democratic Progressive Party(DPP or 民進黨)have used the incident to articulate 
their positions on Taiwanese nationalism.^^ 
24 Murray A. Rubinstein. "The Taiwan Miracle/' The Other Taiwan: 1945 to the 
Present Ed. Murray A. Rubinstein, 1994. p. 4. 
"Report blames Chiang for 2/28 Incident’，. Feb. 20, 2006 
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The arrival of the KMT along with many Mainlanders created a number 
of issues for the Taiwanese. The large amounts of currency brought over led to 
inflation. Furthermore, the fact that 600,000 of the people who fled the Mainland 
to Taiwan were soldiers also served to strain the Taiwanese economy. The way 
the KMT treated the Taiwanese led to a deep and long lasting animosity among 
the Taiwanese, directed at the KMT.27 Although there were members of the KMT 
that wanted to win Taiwanese support and raise their living standards, the 
threats from Taiwan had the effect of prolonging KMT authoritarianism. The 
KMT faced two challenges in 1949 that limited its use of power. The first 
challenge, was the constant threat of attack and subversion posed by the 
Mainland. The other challenge was posed by a "nationalist Taiwanese overseas 
movement dedicated to the overthrow of the KMT and the ROC government, 
which evolved from the brutal suppression of an uprising in February-March 
1947 in Taiwan." The existence of these two threats was a danger to the 
legitimacy of the government and they were dealt with by means of control and 
suppression.28 
During the period of Martial law, which extended from the time the KMT 
fled to Taiwan up until 1987, the government tried to have the incident forgotten. 
27 Ralph N. Clough. "The Enduring Influence of the Republic of China on Taiwan 
Today" The China Quarterly, No. 148, "Special Issue: Contemporary Taiwan." Dec. 
1996 p. 1058. 
28 Linda Chao and Raymond Myer. "The First Chinese Democracy: Political 
Development of the Republic of China on Taiwan, 1986-1984." Asian Survey, Vol. 
34, No. 3 March 1994 p. 215. 
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However, as Taiwan began to change into a democracy and eventually ended 
martial law, the incident began being used as a rallying point. The government 
launched an investigation into the incident and made a report on it in 1992.29 
There were other incidents and factors that helped to steer the course of 
Taiwanese political change. Taiwan's process of democratization began in the 
late 1970s. The Kaohsiung Incident(高雄事件）was instrumental in the process 
that led to the creation of the DPP. This incident occurred in December 1979 and 
was the result of protests which followed a government raid on the Formosa 
Magazine. The incident exposed the tactics and brutality used by the KMT and 
the trials of the protesters that followed was a forum where the KMTs practices 
could be questioned. A number of the people who were involved in the 
Kaohsiung incident later became members of the DPP and won elected office. 
The rise of the opposition party in Taiwan 
During Taiwan's period of Martial Law, opposition parties were generally 
illegal. The Legislature was composed of members who held their positions 
before 1947. The appointment of new members was to be held off until the KMT 
could retake the Mainland. In the 1970s and the 1980s the Dangwai (黨夕卜） 
movement became active. The Dangwai, which in Chinese means "outside of the 
29 John F. Copper. Taiwan: Nation-State or Province! Fourth edition. Cambridge 
Massachusetts: Westview Press, 2003. 
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party" (party here refers to the KMT), was mostly made up of Taiwanese rather 
than Mainlanders. The Dangwai was not a coherent group. Lucian Pye described 
the Dangzmi as "highly individualistic, a collection of ambitious souls who find it 
difficult to collaborate with each other/'^OThe KMT's policies helped the Dangwai 
electorally in some respects. In order to reduce corruption among local officials, 
the KMT had instituted some regulations that limited the freedom of some local 
officials. As a result, these KMT officials were no longer in a position to punish 
electorates that voted in Dangwai mayors and magistrates ^iPeople were in a 
better position to support Dangwai candidates. 
The DPP was eventually formed out of this Dangwai movement in 1986. In 
1991 the existence of the DPP became officially legal. The 2000 election saw the 
DPP take the Taiwanese presidency for the first time. 
Conclusion 
Taiwan has undergone many political and social changes throughout its 
history. Historically it has been ruled by the Dutch, its own short-lived dynasty, 
Mainland China during the Qing dynasty, the KMT(one-party rule), and its own 
democratically elected government. The history of Taiwan is directly linked to 
the history of China. Much of Taiwan's situation throughout history was guided 
Lucian W. Pye. "Taiwan's Development and Its Implications for Beijing and 
Washington." Asian Survey Vol. 26，No. 6 June, 1986 p. 620. 
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and influenced by events that took place on the Mainland. The status quo in the 
Taiwan strait exists partly due to as yet unresolved issues dating back to the 
Chinese Civil War. Additionally, today the majority of Taiwan's inhabitants are 
of Chinese ancestry. However, despite the similarities between the people, the 
Taiwanese and the Mainlanders have had very different historical experiences. 
The Japanese occupation of Taiwan while at the same time attacking the 
Mainland and killing many Chinese caused there to be different views and 
experiences on each side of the Taiwan Strait. Additionally, events that took 
place in Taiwan as a result of KMT rule left deep impressions on the Taiwanese. 
To many Taiwanese, the experience during the early years of KMT rule was 
worse than the experience of living under the Japanese. These events have had 
added significance since Taiwan became democratic. Taiwan's political parties 
are typically supported along different ethnic lines. In the 2004 election, Chen 
Shuibian (P動K扁）used "ethnically divisive rhetoric" that gained him support of 
the Taiwanese "Hoklo"(福偖 / 鶴借)majority, but alienated people who are 
considered to be "Mainlanders". Additionally, the increase of awareness of the 
Taiwanese identity has been helpful to the DPP. According to the Taipei times, 
"As a result of increasing Taiwanese identity over the years' the percentage of 
votes for the DPP has risen from 20 percent in 1996 to 39 percent in 2000 and 50.1 
percent this year" In understanding the situation in the Taiwan Strait, it is very 
32 丁rung Latieule. Taipei Times June 1,2004 p. 8. 
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important to understand the effects that Taiwanese identity has had and will 
have on Taiwanese politics and cross-strait relations. 
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Chapter Two: Literature Review 
In this literature review and throughout this thesis it should be noted that 
the sources used have been English language sources. 
Secession 
By using the word "secession" or in Chinese "fenlie〃(分裂、in the naming 
of the ASL, the PRC has expressed its view that Taiwan is a part of the PRC and 
that the forces on Taiwan who seek dejure independence are in fact seeking 
secession. In order to examine the situation and motives behind the ASL, and to 
properly apply the term "secession" in this situation, it is important to examine 
theories about secession and other secession movements in modem history to 
note their motivations, methods, and consequences and to examine whether or 
not these may help teach us about the Taiwan situation.. In examining other 
countries' dealings with secessionists, one may better understand what outcome 
is to be expected in the Taiwan Strait as well as understand the possible motives 
behind the PRCs passage of the ASL. 
Charles R. Nixon (1972) studied the situation that occurred when 
Eastern Nigerians attempted secession and created the short-lived state called 
the Republic of Biafra. He pointed out that the concept of "self" in discussing 
self-determination is unclear and that the UN mentions the right of self-
I 
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determination, but the "self" being referred to can be viewed as meaning just the 
people who pursue secession, or it can refer to the people who would be affected 
by secession. Additionally, he observed that based on historical events, unilateral 
declarations of independence have not usually led to positive results.^^ Hurst 
Hannum (1990严,a professor of international law, also discussed the idea of 
"self" as it pertains to the issue of self-determination and international law. 
Hannum pointed out that the UN's support of the right of self-determination has 
mostly been in the context of the ending of colonialism. He wrote that "UN and 
state practice since 1960 provides evidence that the international community 
recognizes only a very limited right to 1) external self-determination, defined as 
the right to freedom from a former colonial power, and 2) internal self-
determination, defined as independence of the whole state's population from 
foreign intervention or influence."35 
Based on Nixon's observations, unilateral secession on the part of the 
Taiwanese would unlikely lead to a positive outcome. As the ASL indicates, the 
consequences of such a unilateral move could be harsh. Hannum's observations 
have bearing on the legality of Taiwanese secession. They bring up questions 
such as who this "self" might be who has the right to determine Taiwan's future. 
33 Charles R. Nixon. "Self Determination: The Nigeria/Biafra Case/' VsIoM 
Politics, Vol. 24 no. 4, July 1972. pp. 473-474. 
34 Hurst Hannum. Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The 
Accommodation of Conflicting Rights. Philadelphia: Philadelphia University Press, 
1990. 
35 Ibid. 47. 
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It may include the people of the PRC because secession could impact them. 
Furthermore, a right to self-determination is not necessarily a right to secession. 
John R. Wood (1981), a professor in the department of political science at 
the University of British Columbia, studied preconditions and possible 
influences on secession movements. He pointed out several preconditions that 
may exist for secession to be p u r s u e d . 
Those preconditions which Wood laid out that may be relevant when 
examining the Taiwanese desire for independence are geographical, social, 
political, and psychological. The Geographical precondition exists because 
Taiwan is physically separated from the Mainland. The other preconditions 
would apply because Taiwan and the Mainland have cultural differences and 
different political systems. While none of these preconditions alone necessarily 
ferments a desire for secession, they can be contributing factors. 
Harry Beran (1987)37, a senior lecturer at the University of WoUongong, 
argued in favor of a theory of consent. This type of theory supports the idea of 
the necessity of a government having its constituents' consent, for it to be 
legitimate. In Beran's view, a person being born in a certain state does not make 
36 John R. Wood ''Secession: A Comparative Analytical Framework'' Canadian 
Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique, Vol.14, No. 1 
(March, 1981). pp. 107-134. 
37 Harry Beran The Consent Theory of Political Obligation. New South Wales: 
Croom Helm Publishers, 1987. 
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him a "captive" of the state. He said that "the liberal democratic state must be, as 
far as possible, a voluntary association�38 
Philosophy professor Allen Buchanan (1991 previewed different 
arguments pertaining to secession which are often used by forces working 
toward secession typically use to explain their actions. He also mentions the 
counterarguments and excuses given by governments who resist secessionist 
movements. The arguments are as follows: the argument of consent (if a person 
claims that it is necessary for a legitimate government to have the consent of 
those under its authority, that government must acknowledge the right of 
secession), the right of self determination, the argument of rectificatory justice 
(an area was wrongfully incorporated into the larger entity and as a matter of 
justice must be allowed to secede), the argument of discriminatory 
redistribution(f or example, if a government were to highly tax a certain area, and 
redistribute those funds elsewhere). 
Buchanan (1991)^0 also discussed the issue of whether or not secession is a 
moral right. He concluded that secession is morally permissible, however it 
should only occur under certain circumstances. Instead of arguing for the 
existence of an absolute moral right to secede, Buchanan's view allows for 
secession when it can be properly justified. Another scholar that has this view of 
38 Ibid. 149. 
39 Allen Buchanan. "Toward A Theory of Secession." Ethics, vol. 101, No. 2, 
January 1991 pp.322-342. 
Allen Buchanan. Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce From Fort Sumter to 
Lithuania and Quebec. Boulder, San Francisco and Oxford: Westview Press 1991. 
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secession is a legal scholar. Lea Brilmayer. In her 1991 paper "Secession and Self-
Detennination- A Territorial Interpretation." she expressed her view that a 
convincing argument for secession will be based on a historical claim. If the 
territory was wrongfully annexed, the argument in favor of secession can be 
legitimized. In 2000, Brilmayer stated that "The common characteristic of all 
strong cases for secession is a showing of illegal annexation" .^ ^Since the PRC 
does not exercise authority over Taiwan, Buchanan and Brilmayer's views may 
not be completely applicable. Taiwan is trying to avoid what some might view as 
annexation, instead of trying to undo a past, wrongful annexation. 
Robert A. Young (1994)驳,a professor of political science, studied the 
history of peaceful secessions. He discussed the situations of 
Singapore/ Malaysia, Austria/ Hungary, and Norway/Sweden. Young pointed 
out that there are certain patterns that peaceful secessions have tended to follow. 
According to Young, peaceful secession usually takes place after a long period of 
disagreement between the parties. The declaration of secession is usually 
abnipt(except in the Singapore situation, where it was the predecessor state 
which made the decision to separate). The next step in the process, is that the 
predecessor state accepts the principle of secession, and that step is followed by 
negotiations. The secession galvanizes the people and leads to the governments 
Lea Brilmayer. "Secession and Self-Determination: One Decade Later." Yale 
Journal of International Law. Summer 2000. 
42 Robert A. Young "How Do Peaceful Secessions Happen?" Canadian Journal of 
Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique, Vol. 27, No. 4, December 
1994. p. 773. , 
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being strengthened and solidarity on both sides. Young pointed out that these 
negotiations do not have many participants. The Singapore/ Malaysia 
negotiation only involved the respective Prime-Ministers and their aids. These 
negotiations do not last very long. "When a unit breaks up peacefully, the two 
sides disengage quickly, and the negotiations concern a relatively short list of 
items which are settled in principle"43. The settlement that is made initially does 
not involve many issues. The settlement deals with a few major concerns and 
leaves other, smaller, issues to be worked on in the future. The next observation 
Young made was that in cases of peaceful secession, foreign powers tend to play 
a role. Furthermore, the secession is attained constitutionally. "Peaceful 
secessions, without exception, are achieved through established legal 
processes...There is no legal rupture of the type associated with unilateral 
declarations of independence."紐While peaceful secession is done 
constitutionally, there are usually no other constitutional changes made at the 
time. Policies made in the two countries begin to diverge. The last observation 
made here by Young is that the secession is irrevocable. Reunification after 
peaceful secession has not occurred. This point can be applied to Taiwan's 
situation. Based on this theory, if Taiwan were to peacefully secede from the 
PRC, any future unification would be unlikely. 
43 ibid. p. 785. 
44 ibid. p. 787. 
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Christopher H. Wellman (1995)45 argued in favor of the right of self-
determination. He made the point that a state is not justified in blocking the 
secession of a particular part of the country because it believes secession would 
increase vulnerability to attack or cause economic harm. This claim may only 
limit the conditions of secession, but should not be used as a basis to completely 
stop secession. Another scholar who supports the idea of self-determination and 
the right of secession is Daniel Philpott (1995), a political scientist at the 
University of Notre Dame.^^ Philpott acknowledged that the right to self-
determination does have certain limits. "A second guideline, then, is that a 
group's right to self-determination is qualified by the injustices it inflicts on the 
larger state". Philpott continued to write "The general principle, though, is an 
international version of classic liberal individual freedom: with its enhanced 
independence- a separate state or federal autonomy- the group may govern 
exclusively in affairs that are truly its own, but, in matters which affect the larger 
state, i t retains outside o b l i g a t i o n s ' ' ^ ^ 
Stephane Dion (1996), a Canadian political scientist and politician, pointed 
out that the likelihood of secession occurring in a democracy is dependent on the 
confidence inspired by the prospect of independence as well as by the fear of 
45 Christopher H. Wellman. "A Defense of Secession and Political Self-
Determination/' Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 24 No. 2, Spring 1995. pp. 142-
171. 
46 Daniel Philpott. "In Defense of Self-Determination." Ethics, Vol. 105, No. 2, Jan. 
1995 p. 352-385. 
Ibid p. 363. 
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remaining in the union. If the fear and confidence are both high, secession will be 
likely. If both fear and confidence are low, secession is impossible. If fear of 
staying unified is low and the confidence inspired by secession is high, secession 
will be unlikely. If the fear of being in the union is high but confidence in 
secession is low than secession will also be unlikely 
Buchanan (1997)49 said that there are two ways to classify normative 
theories of secession. There is the "primary" right and the "remedial" right. The 
primary right of secession is meant to allow groups to secede from a state, even if 
that state has been fair and just to that group. Among the primary right theories 
are "Ascriptive Group Theories and Associative Group Theories". The former, 
allows for the primary right to secede only when there is some common group 
characteristic, for example, a distinct ethnic group that wishes to secede. The 
latter, allows any group within the state to have the right of secession as long as 
the majority wishes to secede. Those that support "remedial" right theories, 
believe that secession should only be possible as a remedy for a group that has 
been mistreated in some way. Secession can only occur as a type of compensation 
for a past injustice. 
Stephane Dion. "Why is secession difficult in Well-Established Democracies? 
Lessons From Quebec." British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 26, No. 2 April 
1996, pp. 272-273. 
49 Allen Buchanan. ''Theories Of Secession/' Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 26, 
No. 1 Winter, 1997, pp. 31-61. 
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Charney and Prescott (2000)^0 (Victor Prescott is a social scientist at the 
University of Wollingong, and Jonathan Charney was a professor of law at 
Vanderbilt University) wrote a very informative article for the American Journal 
of International Law that discussed the international legal issues pertaining to 
Taiwan's situation. They discussed many possible legal arguments that may be 
used by both sides in their claims. Some of the questions they address are: Is the 
PRC the legitimate successor state to the China of the Qing dynasty? Who was 
supposed to take control of Taiwan after World War II? Would a Chinese attack 
on Taiwan in case of a declaration of independence be legal or illegal within the 
bounds of international law? The answers to these questions are important in 
attempting to find a legal solution to the Taiwan situation and could have 
bearing on the legitimacy of a law such as the ASL. 
Taiwan's situation is unique in that with other secession movements, a 
group typically wishes to break away from the larger polity and create its own 
sovereign nation. However, for many years while Taiwan was considered a 
rogue province by the PRC, the Taiwanese government itself upheld a "one-
China'' policy and was responsible for limiting the activity of independence 
movements on Taiwan. Additionally, another aspect of the Taiwan situation 
which contributes to its being unique is that from the time Chiang Kaishek fled 
to Taiwan up until late 1971 the government in Taipei was deemed the legitimate 
Jonathan I. Charney and J.R.V. Prescott. "Resolving Cross-Strait Relations 
between China and Taiwan." The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 94, 
No. 3 July, 2000. 
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government of China in the international communityFurthermore, unlike 
many secessionist movements, Taiwan has never been under the political control 
of the polity it is supposed to be seceding from, the People's Republic of China. 
However, it is important to note where other cases have relevance to the Taiwan 
situation. For example, the conditions mentioned by Dion can help us 
understand some of goals that Beijing may seek to achieve with the ASL. The 
ASL could be an effective means of reducing Taiwan's confidence in its post-
independence prospects. Furthermore, the improved cross-strait relations being 
promoted by the ASL could reduce the fear of unification. 
The Anti-Secession Law 
In March 2005, John J. Tkacik Jr., a senior research fellow at the Asian 
Studies Center of the Heritage Foundation, predicted that the ASL will strain 
Sino-American ties.^^Richard C. Bush III (2005), an expert in Northeast Asian 
policy studies and Sino-U.S. relations, in reference to the ASL, said that it has 
"single-handedly transformed the security equation in East Asia and the political 
This was when the United Nations seat held by the Republic of China was 
given over to the People's Republic of China. 
�2 John J. Tkacik Jr. "Secession Law Strains Ties." March 10,2005 
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atmosphere on Taiwan." He also went on to say that the best Taiwanese response 
to the ASL would be "restraint"." 
Zhu Zhiqun (2004) said that anti-secession or unification legislation had 
been anticipated for . Zhu says that the law "will also confirm China's pledge to 
the international community that it desires to maintain the status quo across the 
Taiwan Strait".^^Zhu Zhiqun's outlook on the ASL is relatively positive. 
Bonnie Glaser, an expert of Sino-U.S. relations with the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, pointed out in 2005 that the ASL along with 
certain other moves represented a change in Beijing's strategy. She stated that "a 
decision was taken by Chinese leaders to postpone the goal of reunification and 
focus on preventing separation" .55 
An editorial in March 2005 in the Taipei Times by Amit Chanda, an 
analyst who frequently writes about Asian political and security issues, 
mentioned that the Anti-Secession Law could be considered dangerous because 
it is worded vaguely. 
53 Richard C. Bush III. "Taiwan Should Exercise Restraint in Reacting to the 
Challenge of China's Anti-Secession Law." March 24,2005. 
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Banning Garrett, who is an American expert on Sino-U.S. relations, and 
Jonathan Adams (2006)56of the Atlantic Council of the United States, pointed out 
that the ASL was not as harsh as it was expected to be. Since the ASL did not 
include the "one country, two systems" formula or include a clause pertaining to 
Taiwan being a part of the PRC. Instead it simply upheld the One-China Policy. 
Taiwanese Identity 
Sheldon Appleton (1970), an American professor of political science, 
studied attitudes of students in Taiwan. He looked at surveys that compared the 
attitudes of the Taiwanese and Mainlander students. He found that despite the 
economic and political disparities and a tendency for the Mainlanders and 
Taiwanese to usually mix within their own group and not with the other group, 
"the students on Taiwan responded to the battery of questions put to them 
essentially as members of a single (unified, not fragmented) political c i i l t u r e " 5 7 . 
Essentially, despite differences in class and power, the Mainlanders and 
Taiwanese shared similar political outlooks. He remarked that the differences 
that are noticeable can be traced back to the time the Mainlanders came to 
Taiwan. Lucian W. Pye (1986) said that since Taiwan is not politically monolithic, 
56 "Taiwan In Search of A Strategic Consensus. “ The Atlantic Council of The United 
States. 2006. 
57 Sheldon Appleton. "Taiwanese and Mainlanders of Taiwan: A Survey of Student 
Attitudes." The China Quarterly, No. 44，Oct-December 1970 p. 56. 
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Western analysts that pushed for Taiwan to be more "trusting and responsive" to 
PRC initiatives did not recognize that there are opinion groups on Taiwan that 
limit Taiwanese leader's freedom of choice. He also pointed out that the issue of 
Taiwanese sovereignty served a function that was not recognized by many 
analysts. Those who believed that their claim of sovereignty was merely a 
holdover from the ROC in China period were mistaken. "By agreeing to the 
pretension of sovereignty, Taiwanese are able to pass a loyalty test and freely 
join both the KMT and the dang-wai".58Pye described the "pretension of 
sovereignty" as the myth that the government was a sovereign entity and not just 
the administrator of a province. Pye also observed that at the time much of 
Taiwan's economy was dominated by Taiwanese, and that social relations on the 
island were generally easy. He observed that there were many mixed 
(Taiwanese/ Mainlander) marriages. The main areas where tensions existed were 
in the political arena. 
Trong R. Chai (1986)59 wrote that "The Taiwanese are no more Chinese 
than the Americans are British". He acknowledged that the Taiwanese 
population is almost all ethnically Chinese, but that the 90 year separation from 
the Mainland had changed their identity. In Trong's view, if China's claim over 
Taiwan is valid because the Taiwanese are "Chinese", China could make a 
similar claim and annex Singapore. 
Pye. 616. 
59 Trong R. Chai. "The Future of Taiwan.，，山zVzw Survey Vol. 26，No. 12，December 1986 
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In 1987 Chen Qimao wrote a paper that responded to Chai and discussed 
the PRC's view on cross-strait relations. His goal was to refute certain ideas that 
contradict Chinese claims of sovereignty over Taiwan. Chen claimed that except 
for a small minority that are dedicated to the cause of Taiwan independence, 
most Taiwanese will still identify as "Chinese". He claimed that the majority of 
Taiwanese believe that one day Taiwan and China would be unified^o. 
Niou and Hsieh (1996)^^ wrote that National identity in Taiwan "is 
probably the most controversial and divisive issue in Taiwanese politics". They 
also wrote that most Mainlanders believe that Taiwan should one day be unified 
with the Mainland and that those who prefer independence are almost 
exclusively Taiwanese. 
Political scientist Shelley Rigger (1999-2000)62 examined the 
issue of the Taiwanese identity. She argued that social scientists have placed too 
much emphasis on the correlation between National Identity and the 
independence/unification issue. The dichotomous definition of Taiwanese 
identity has prevented social scientists from adequately understanding the issue. 
Having a National identity in Taiwan does not necessarily lead to a desire to 
permanently break away from the Mainland. 
Qimao, Chen. "The Taiwan Issue and Sino-US Relations: A PRC View." Asian Survey, 
Vol. 27. No. 11 Nov. 1987 pp. 1161-1175. 
61 Emerson Niou and，John Fuh Sheng Hsieh. "Salient Issues in Taiwan's Electoral 
Politics." Electoral Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2，1996 p. 222. 
62 Shelley Rigger. "Social Science and National Identity: A Critique" Pacific Affairs, Vol. 
72, No. 4 Special Issue: Taiwan Strait Winter 1999-2000 p. 537. 
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Yuan Peng (2004), a scholar at the Brookings Institution, discussed 
the idea of Taiwan identity as opposed to Taiwan independence. He mentions 
that the US and China have different interpretations of Chen's 2004 victory. "For 
many American analysts, the 2004 election increased focus on "Taiwan identity" 
rather than on "Taiwan independence"...For Mainland Chinese, the election 
implies that the pro-independence forces have gradually risen to dominance and 
will continue to guide Taiwan domestic politics. He also stressed that "Taiwan 
identity" and "Taiwan independence" are two different concepts which should 
not be confused with each other. "Taiwan Identity" is the Taiwanese people's 
sense of themselves, it is a natural product of their self-awareness, that the 
people in Taiwan as an entity possess distinct qualities that differentiate them 
from others (Mainlanders or Chinese), or the others from them." He also 
described three main reasons why the Taiwan identity was formed in the first 
place. The first reason relates to ethnic integration. With Taiwan containing 
Mainlanders, Hakka, Taiwanese, and Aboriginals all on an island, identifying as 
Taiwanese becomes common sense for most people in Taiwan. Another reason is 
simply that Taiwan has been politically separated from the Mainland since 1894 
(albeit united for a short period after World War II), and therefore has had its 
own concerns. The third reason is that throughout their history, the Taiwanese 
have traditionally had the need to react with and deal with outsiders. Resisting 
outsiders certainly provides a motivation for forming a local identity.^^ 
63 Peng Yuan. "The Taiwan Issue In the Context of New Sino-US Strategic Cooperation." 
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Developments in Taiwanese Society 
Tun-Jen Cheng (1989产 traced the development of democracy in Taiwan. 
He attributed the successful rise of democracy in large part to the middle class 
that grew during Taiwan's period of economic growth which started in the early 
1960s. The growth of this intellectual middle class led to the spread of democratic 
ideas and the opening of forums that made it impossible for the KMT to control. 
In 1994, Nancy Bemkopf Tucker illustrated the significance of the creation 
of the DPP. "The energizing of the opposition, leading to the creation of the 
Democratic Progressive Party, transformed the political dialogue in Taiwan 
during the 1980s. Although it remained possible to be arrested for political 
crimes, new areas of discourse became acceptable in the public arena". Due to 
the fact that most people who were a part of this movement were Taiwanese, 
issues such as self-determination became prominent.^^Alan M. Wachman (1994) 
pointed out that throughout the period which led up to the 1992 Taiwanese 
Legislative Yuan election, the "most significant opposition to the KMT existed as 
CNAPS Working Paper, November 2004，The Brookings Institution. 
^ Tun-Jen Cheng "Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan." World 
Politics Vol. 41, No. 4 July 1989 pp. 471-499. 
65 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker. Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States, 1945-
1992:Uncertain Friendships. New York, Twayne Publishers 1994. p. 181. 
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an expression of Taiwanese identity.^^This means that the opposition was fueled 
by those Taiwanese that felt their identity needed more recognition. 
Ralph N. Clough (1996)67 wrote that Taiwanese society has been 
influenced by four main factors. These factors are: Traditional China; which has 
given the Taiwanese their language as well as basic culture and customs. Japan; 
the fifty year period of colonial rule on the Taiwan led to changes in Taiwanese 
society and also led to the Taiwanese having a different experience during those 
fifty years. The Republic of China; Since the ROC took control of Taiwan "bring 
from the mainland its ideology, its educational system, its constitutional 
structure, its political and social institutions, and a governing elite, most of 
whom spoke a different dialect of Chinese from the people of Taiwan/'^SThe 
fourth major influence Clough mentioned is the cosmopolitan one. This 
cosmopolitan influence is mostly the influence of Western countries (originally 
mostly the United States) on Taiwan. Shui-Yan Tang and Ching-Ping Tang 
(1997)69 pointed out the significance of the KMT's ability to remain in power 
despite holding open elections while Taiwan made the transition from a Leninist 
regime to a full-fledged democracy. They remarked that Taiwan's situation at 
66 Alan M. Wachman. Taiwan, National Identity and Democratization New York, 
and London, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, 1994 p. 255. 
67 Ralph N. Clough. "The Enduring Influence of The Republic of China On 
Taiwan Today." from The China Quarterly, No. 148, Special Issue: Contemporary 
Taiwan, Dec. 1996 pp. 1054-1071. 
68 ibid. p. 1054 
69 Shui-Yan Tang and Ching-Ping Tang. "Democratization and Environmental 
Politics in Taiwan." Asian Survey, Vol. 37, No. 3 (March 1997). 
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that time marked an exception to Samuel P. Hungtington's theory that in the 
"third wave" of democratization "almost all authoritarian regimes that tried to 
legitimize their de facto authority via open elections were eventually defeated by 
theballot"70. 
David Lampton (2000)^1, a professor of China studies at Johns Hopkins, 
discussed the idea that Chinese leaders need to have proper Taiwan credentials 
in order to maintain authority. He discussed the facts that while trying to secure 
his position as China's future leader, Jiang Zemin needed to establish his 
toughness on Taiwan. After he established his Taiwan credentials, he was able to 
be more flexible with his policies. A similar point was made by Yun-han Chu in 
2004^2. He mentioned that Chinese leaders like to take their own stance on 
Taiwan policy. When Deng Xiaoping was the Chinese leader, he created the 
"one country, two systems" policy. He mentioned that Chinese leaders have to 
deal with the Taiwan issue very carefully because it is an issue of great 
importance. If mishandled, it could possibly destroy the career of a Chinese 
leader. On the other hand, rewards from the Taiwan situation are more long-
term rather than short-term. Basically, it is an issue of utmost importance that 
new Chinese leaders must address. 
282 
71 David Lampton. Same Bed Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China relations, 1989-
2000. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001. 
72 Yun-han Chu. "Power Transition and the Making of Beijing's Policy towards Taiwan." 
2004 The New Chinese Leadership: Challenges and Opportunities After the Party 
Congress, The China Quarterly Special Issues New Series No. 4. Ed. Yun-han Chu. 
Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
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T.W. Wang (2001)73 pointed out the significance of Chen Shuibian's 
victory in the Taiwanese election as well as its large impact on the course of 
cross-strait relations. He also noted that Beijing's pre-election threats (in 
1999/2000) backfired and in fact helped the DPP. The other issue he discusses is 
that for political reasons, Chen Shuibian was unable to accept the One China 
principle. 
In 2005 Richard C. Bush III discussed the idea that the Mainland and the 
Taiwanese are "talking at each other" rather than working with each other. In his 
view, the Mainland has consistently proposed a "one country, two systems" 
model similar to the one being used with Hong Kong. However, even during 
periods when Taiwan's government has accepted a "one China" policy, it has 
always rejected this model. Instead, he says that "And as I read it, Taiwan has 
always taken the position that we possess sovereignty- we're not going to be like 
Hong Kong- and that the Republic of China has existed, and if there's going to 
be unification, it has to be on those terms"？斗. 
73 T.Y. Wang. "Cross Strait Relations after the 2000 Election In Taiwan: Changing 
Tactics in a New Reality." ^ zan Survey, Vol. 41，No. 5 Sept-Oct 2001. 
74 "Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait: A Discussion With 
Richard Bush" Monday, Sept. 12 2005 The Brookings Institution, 
www.brookings.edu. 
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Chapter Three: The Current State of Relations Between the United States of 
America, and the People's Republic of China 
This chapter is included in this thesis for the purpose of understanding 
the relationship between the U.S. and the PRC For almost the entire span of the 
history of the Republic of China on Taiwan the U.S. has had a security interest in 
Taiwan and had acted as a protector of Taiwan (see chapter four). Taiwan was 
the recipient of American economic aid for much of its early history. When a law 
like the ASL is passed, its effects are not limited to cross-strait relations. Since the 
PRC was likely aware of this when it passed the law, it is probable that the PRC 
considered the effect the ASL would have on Sino-U.S. relations. Therefore, it is 
important to briefly discuss the state of Sino-U.S. relations, in order to better 
understand the reasons for the passage of the ASL in 2005 as well as what effects 
the ASL had and will have on this relationship and the Taiwan-U.S. relationship. 
The relationship between the US and China is in some respects adversarial 
» 
and in other respects cooperative. Jing Dongyuan summarized the current state 
of the U.S.-Chinese relationship. "Since September 11' China and the U.S. have 
cooperated closely on seeking solutions to the North Korean Nuclear crisis, 
fought the global war on terrorism and promoted regional peace and stability 
from the sub-continent to the Asia-Pacific. Former secretary of state Colin Powell 
described the relationship as its best in 30 years. That assessment was endorsed 
by the Chinese leadership. However, over the past few months, the bilateral 
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relationship has come under increasing strain. Beijing was chastised for its 
currency manipulation that kept the exchange rate arbitrarily low for unfair 
trade advantage; this was blamed for the huge US trade deficits with China and 
the loss of American jobs. US intelligence and Defense officials sounded alarm 
over and raised questions about China's increasing defense spending. The 
Pentagon report on Chinese military power suggests that Beijing's ambitions for 
sphere of influence go beyond the Taiwan Strait. Congress views the Chinese 
state-run China National Offshore Oil's bid to acquire Unocal of the US as a 
potential threat to US energy s ecu r i t y . " t s 
One major facet of the relationship in recent history has been economics. It 
has even been argued by some that economics is in fact the most important area 
of Sino-US r e l a t i ons . 7 6 China has maintained a state of very high economic 
growth from the beginning of its "open door policy" in the late 1970s. The fast 
pace of Chinese growth continues, and in fact the PRC has taken measures to 
make sure the Chinese economy will not overheat. From 1990-2004 the Chinese 
economy grew at an average rate of ten percent, which was the highest in the 
world. China is now the world's third largest trading nation behind the U.S. and 
Germany. The U.S. is one of China's top trading partners. In the year 2004, 
China's trade surplus with the U.S. was 162 billion U.S. dollars. Many products 
75 Jing Dong Yuan. "China, US discuss their relationship" Jul. 2005. 
http: / / cns.miis.edu / pubs / other / jdyuan/ 050730.pdf 
76 Cai Fanglei "Economic Perspectives: Economic Interests in Sino-American 
Relations" Van Wie Davis, Elizabeth Chinese Perspectives On Sino-U.S. Relations, 
1950-2000 Edwin MeUen Press, 2000, p. 157. 
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manufactured by American companies are made in China. Access to the Chinese 
market has been much broader since China's entry into the World Trade 
Organization in 2001.77 In the economic sector, the U.S. and China have clashed 
over some issues. These issues include, but are not limited to, intellectual 
property rights, the trade deficit and imbalances in certain areas such as textiles, 
and the continued control the Chinese government exerts over its currency, the 
Yuan. On one hand, the PRC is a place where U.S. companies can take advantage 
of cheap labor, and then have their products shipped back to the U.S. On the 
other hand, the Chinese have also been accused of taking manufacturing jobs 
away from U.S. cities^^ by keeping the value of their currency artificially low. The 
loss of jobs due to the U.S. trade deficit with China is an important issue for the 
U.S. American pressure has caused China to take some action towards resolving 
these issues. However, the possibilities of high tariffs on Chinese goods and a 
trade war still exist. 
In addition to economic and financial issues, the U.S. and China have a 
competitive relationship pertaining to issues of security and their militaries. 
During his testimony before the Committee Defense Review Threat Panel on 
Asia Armed Services Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, Peter T.R. 
Brookes from the Asian Studies Center said: 
77 U.S. State Department Website 
http: / / www.state.gov/r/ pa/ei/bgn/18902.htm 
78 "Commission Releases Study on the Job Effects of the Rising U.S.-China Trade 
Deficit." Jan. 11, 2005. 
http://www.iiscc.gov/pressreleases/2005/05-01_llpr.htm 
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"There is no doubt that the rise of China will play the greatest role in 
defining and shaping the context and texture of the Asian security 
environment in the coming decades. In turn, China's ascendance will 
have a significant effect on American interests in Asia... Per haps no 
development is more disconcerting than China's military buildup- a 
defense modernization program that is raising eyebrows in both 
Washington and across Asia...In addition to a growing defense 
budget, Beijing will also develop a world-class defense industry 
within the next 10 to 15 years. Though it currently buys most of its 
advanced weaponry from Russia, including SU-27 fighters, 
Sovremennyy destroyers, and Kilo-class submarines, China is making 
progress on developing its own cruise missiles, fighters, submarines, 
and naval ships and the Chinese military industrial complex develops. 
Further, a decision by the European Union to lift its current arms 
embargo against China will accelerate the modernization of the 
People's Liberation Army/'79 
79 Testimony of Peter T.R. Brookes, Senior Fellow for National Security Affairs 
and Director, Asian Studies Center, Before the Committee Defense Review 
Threat Panel on Asia Armed Services Committee of the U.S. House of 
Representatives. September 25, 2005. 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/tst093005a.cfm 
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The effects of the Chinese military buildup and modernization on the 
cross-Strait relationship are significant. For example, one issue that Brookes 
brings up is the issue of the possibility of Europe lifting its embargo on arms 
sales to China. Since, according to David Shambaugh, the lifting of the embargo 
will help China modernize its military more quickly, it could possibly raise the 
threat that China poses to Taiwan and make the possible cost of U.S. aid to 
Taiwan higher. In an article presenting a position against the European Union 
lifting the embargo, Shambaugh wrote: "From the American perspective, none of 
these arguments touch the real issues: maintaining the security of Taiwan and 
preventing China from possessing European arms that might be used against 
American forces.〃冗hina's acquisition of more advanced weaponry could not 
only impact Sino-U.S. relations, but also cross-strait relations. 
In recent years there have been events that have led to confrontations 
between the U.S and China. One notable situation that brought U.S.-Chinese 
relations to a boiling point was the Taiwan Strait crisis that took place during the 
years 1995-1996. It was at this time that President Clinton of the U.S., despite 
promises made to the Chinese, granted then Taiwanese President Li Denghui (李 
登輝）a visa to visit the U.S. Li Denghui while en route to other destination, was 
in Hawaii while his plane was being refueled. He requested to disembark the 
plane briefly and this request was denied. This denial made members of the U.S. 
soDavid Shambaugh "Don't lift the Arms Embargo On China." The International 
Herald Tribune Feb. 23,2005. 
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congress upset at the treatment an ally had received at the hands of the executive 
branch of governmental. In response, congress passed a resolution that 
recommended to President Clinton the granting of a visa to Li for a private visit 
to the U.S. Li Denghui had requested this visa to attend a gathering at his alma 
mater, Cornell University, in Ithaca, New York. The resolution in congress 
received such broad support that Clinton chose to respect it and granted Li the 
visa. 
The fact that the U.S. had gone back on its word was not well received 
with the Chinese government. Before that point in time, the Chinese government 
mostly recognized the importance of dealing with the U.S. Executive branchfThe 
President and his staff) rather than the Legislative branch (Congress). The 
Taiwanese had already for a long time been spending money on, and had been 
making efforts to lobby members of the U.S. congress. Congressional visits to 
Taiwan were not uncommon. However, the PRC typically only had dealings 
with the President and his staff. This incident illustrated the fact that the U.S. 
legislative branch could have an impact on Sino-US relations. 
The Chinese responded to the visit and speech made by Li Denghui by 
performing some military exercises in the Taiwan Strait. These exercises were 
seen as a warning to the Taiwanese about their aspirations towards 
independence. The actions taken by China elicited a powerful response by Bill 
81 Letter from Senators Frank Murkowski and Hank Brown to William Clinton, 
President, http://wwwias.org/news/taiwan/1994/s940519-taiwan.htm 
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Clinton. He ordered two aircraft carriers to the region to illustrate that the U.S. 
does have security interests in the region, specifically interest in the security of 
Taiwan. The act of sending aircraft carriers by the U.S. to the region was 
interpreted by many Taiwanese as American willingness to defend Taiwan. In a 
sense, there were Taiwanese that felt there was no need to worry about making 
conciliatory gestures to the PRC when the U.S. has shown it would aid Taiwan in 
the event of a Mainland attack. Furthermore, the fact that the Mainland was 
willing to threaten the Taiwanese in such a manner resonated strongly with some 
Taiwanese. The actions taken by the People's Liberation Army caused both "fear 
and dislike" among many Taiwanese and discouraged the desire for unification. 
After both sides had shown that the situation in the Taiwan Strait held 
importance for them, summits were held between the two heads of state, Clinton 
and Jiang Zemin of C h i n a ® ^ . This incident and the subsequent events that 
occurred as a result underscore the sensitivity of the U.S.-China relationship. 
Tensions can rise very quickly in the Taiwan Strait as a result of actions or words 
that may seem innocuous at the time. 
Another issue that demonstrates the potentially inflammatory 
relationship between the U.S. and China is the issue of the surveillance plane that 
landed in Hainan Island in 2001. Following a midair collision between a U.S. 
surveillance plane and a PRC fighter jet in 2001, the fighter jet crashed and its 
82 Chas. W. Freeman Jr. "Preventing War in the Taiwan Strait: Restraining 
Taiwan - and Beijing/' Foreign Affairs, Jul-Aug. 1998 vol. 77 no. 4 
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pilot died. The U.S. plane was forced to land on Hainan Island in Southern 
China. The events that followed illustrate the potential for friction in the U.S.-
Chinese relationship. China blamed the American pilot for the incident's, while 
the U.S. had maintained it was an accident. Ultimately, the crew of the plane was 
returned to the U.S. although the plane had to be dismantled since China refused 
to allow it to be flown off Hainan. The crisis was resolved when U.S. said it was 
"very sorry" about the Chinese pilot's death and the emergency landing without 
permission on Hainan Island.財 One effect that this collision had, was the rupture 
of military ties between the U.S. and the PRC. 85 
Both of these incidents illustrate the potential to easily create standoffs 
between the U.S. and China. Both of these incidents created situations where 
both governments had to be careful in order to satisfy their domestic and foreign 
policy objectives. The following are some of the issues that the U.S. and the 
P.R.C. have that will require attention. 
"The key American concerns are: the US trade deficit; intellectual 
property rights enforcement; access to China's domestic market under 
China's terms of accession to the World Trade Organisation; 
modernisation of the Chinese military; honouring the "one country, 
83 "U.S. Chides China for Holding Spy Plane Crew" CNN News April 2,2001. 
http://archives.cnn.eom/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/east/04/02/china.aircollision. 
03/ 
84 "Spy Plane back in US" July 6,2001. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/ americas/1425318.stm 
85Thom Shanker, The New York Times, October 2005. 
54 
two systems" model in Hong Kong; easing tensions with Taiwan; and 
creating a nuclear-free North Korea. 
China's concerns include grasping the opportunity for economic 
development; preventing Taiwan from seeking independence; 
avoiding strategic competition with the US; ensuring access of 
Chinese products to the American market; and securing co-operation 
with the US on global issues such as a stable international oil market, 
environmental protection, anti-terrorism and non-prol i ferat ion.〃秘 
However, while this relationship will certainly meet some obstacles in 
trying to create warmer ties, there are reasons for thinking that the U.S. and 
China can overcome many of them. Since the attacks on the U.S. on September 
ll^h 2001, President George W. Bush has embarked on what he called a "war on 
terror". At the time that this war began, the U.S. needed to shift its foreign policy 
focus on the Middle East and A1 Queda. In order to fight the war on terror 
President Bush has sought allies. Jiang Zemin, China's leader at the time, gave 
his support for the war on terror. Additionally, he wanted U.S. support to fight 
what Beijing views as terrorists in places like X i n j i a n g . ^ ^ 
86 David Shambaugh. "Sino-American Bridges Need to be Repaired/' Financial 
Times, Sept. 1, 2005. 
http://www.brookings.edu / views/ op-ed/shambaugh/20050901.htm 
87 Elizabeth Economy, The Council on Foreign Relations, 
http://www.cfr.org/publication.html?id=6255 
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The U.S. has also needed China's help in stopping the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons. The major recent example of U.S.-PRC bilateral cooperation 
has been in the effort to convince North Korea to stop its nuclear weapons 
program. As North Korea's only regional ally, China has a special role to play as 
a go-between for the two sides. North Korea would prefer to have bilateral talks 
with the U.S. However, the U.S. prefers to have multi-party talks and prefers that 
Beijing pressure North Korea to give up its weapons program. In the view of the 
U.S. government, allowing two-way talks would act as a type of reward for 
North Korea's nuclear aspirationsMn recent months, the six party talks have 
made progress. While the U.S. and China have had differences over how the 
North Korea situation should be handled, they have been able to put aside some 
of these differences and reach c omp rom i s e s . 8 9 According to some, not letting 
North Korea get its hands on Nuclear Weapons is in the best interest of both 
parties. On issues like this one, U.S.-Chinese cooperation has been able to 
produce fruitful results. 
88 Andrew F. Diamond and Daniel A. Pinkston. "Don't Outsource North Korea 
Problem To China." April 25,2005. 
http:// cns.miis.edu/pubs/other/pmkston_050425.htm 




Chapter Four: The History and Nature of America's security commitment to 
Taiwan 
The security commitment that the US has extended to Taiwan in one form 
or another has existed for over a half century. It is a very pertinent issue and a 
possible thorn in the side of the betterment of Sino-US relations. The implications 
of the commitment not only involve the US, China, and Taiwan, but also possibly 
involve the US's other security commitments in East Asia. In this chapter I intend 
to first discuss the history of the security commitment. I will also discuss how the 
security commitment has transformed over the years. The same commitment that 
the US extended to Taiwan under President Eisenhower is not the same 
commitment that exists today. Additionally I will discuss the implications the 
security commitment has had in recent years. Another issue that makes this 
I commitment a salient issue regarding the situation in the Taiwan Strait is how 
the concept of U S protection relates to the desire for independence or lack thereof 
on the part of the Taiwanese people. 
The connection between the K M T and the U.S. dates back to the time the 
K M T was the government of Mainland China. The U.S. had aided the K M T 
against the C C P during their civil war on the Mainland. Aid was first given to 
the K M T in order to help China fight Japan during World War II. Following 
Chiang Kai-shek's retreat to Taiwan after losing the Mainland, the Americans 
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were apprehensive about continuing to help him. However, even after his failure 
on the Mainland, cultural and political factors led the U.S. to continue supporting 
his regime.% 
At first during 1949 it seemed to the Americans that Chiang Kai-shek's fall 
on Taiwan would have been all but inevitable. In the wake of this determination, 
the U.S. had decided to withdraw its support for Taiwan. The government did 
not want to risk incurring Chinese anger over interference in the matter. 
Additionally, the President wanted to minimize the political fallout from the 
defeat of Chiang. Subsequently on the 5出 of January in 1950 President Harry 
Truman announced that he would not have the U.S. intervene in the event of a 
Communist takeover of Taiwan. However, this situation did not last long. 
Support for Taiwan began to grow as a result of the China Lobby and the period 
of McCarthyism. "The importance of the China issue to McCarthyism and more 
broadly to the Republican Party had little to do with China. Developments in 
Asia became controversial because of the personal and partisan aims they could 
serve. Joseph McCarthy, guided by China lobby contacts, came to see the 
communism-in-China issue as a boost to his flagging career." It was during this 
era between the years 1951-1954 the U.S. State Department destroyed the careers 
of a number of China experts.9i Because of the anti-communist sentiment felt by 
many in Congress, support for Taiwan was revived. Some support came through 
Tucker, p. 25. 
91 ibid., 31 
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continued economic aid. It has also been asserted that some members of the U.S. 
government secretly sold weapons to Taiwan. 
The significant change that led to U.S. support of the government on 
Taiwan occurred in 1950 with the beginning of the Korean War. The Korean War 
brought the U.S. back into the Asian theater. Under the "Truman Doctrine" the 
U.S. undertook a policy of containing communism. This led the U.S. to 
reconsider its position regarding Taiwan. The Seventh Fleet was dispatched and 
given orders to patrol the Taiwan Strait. Chiang Kai-shek offered his support to 
the United Nations(UN) forces fighting in Korea. Additionally, Chiang held 
high-level meetings with U.S. General Douglas MacArthur w h o was the leader of 
the UN's coalition forces. This situation led to a more important role for Taiwan 
in U.S. strategic interests in Asia. Subsequently President Truman made U.S. 
military aid to Taiwan official. However, at this point he still felt that this aid was 
only temporary. Taiwan continued to benefit from the Cold War atmosphere. For 
example, when the U.S. signed a peace treaty with Japan, it set up bases on Japan 
and made Japan open diplomatic ties with Taiwan but not with the Mainland. 
Furthermore, in 1950 the Soviet Union boycotted the UN. This boycott, which 
some believe was actually partially fueled by the fact that the Soviet Union 
actually preferred the exclusion of the PRC at the UN92, helped pave the way for 
Taiwan to keep the "China" seat on the United Nations Security Council. The 
February 1951 resolution passed by the UN's general assembly which labeled 
92 Fairbank and Twicthett (eds.) The Cambridge History of China vol. 14, p. 278 
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China as an aggressor, made it unlikely that the PRC would be able to take the 
China Security Council seat anytime in the near future. The U.S. also changed its 
view regarding the status of Taiwan. While previously supporting Taiwan's 
status as a part of China, in June 1950 President Truman announced that 
Taiwan's permanent status would be pending until restoration of security in the 
Pacific. 
President Truman was succeeded by a Republican, Dwight Eisenhower. 
Before Eisenhower became President, the K M T had hoped for a Republican in 
the White House because Republicans tended to be more sympathetic to their 
cause. While Eisenhower's policies were overall favorable towards Taiwan, the 
Taiwanese did not achieve all of their objectives. Taiwan lobbied to sign a mutual 
defense treaty with the U.S. "Nationalist Chinese determination to sign a mututal 
defense treaty with the United States yielded a draft agreement in the autumn of 
1953 not long after Washington had concluded a similar pact with South Korea. 
But rather than welcome this indication of Taipei's affections, the State 
Department displayed reluctance to consider it seriously. Chiang Kai-shek 
thereupon marshaled his supporters both inside and outside the government to 
lobby for the agreement as a guarantee for his government's survival/' Chiang 
eventually was able to obtain an agreement in December of 1954. After taking a 
"wait and see approach" this agreement formalized the alliance between the US 
and the Republic of China on Taiwan. However, there were certain stipulations. 
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Taiwan was not supposed to create hostilities between itself and the Mainland 
without prior approval of the US government. 
Eisenhower made a commitment to defend the island of Taiwan from 
Mainland aggression, but he did not commit to the defense of the outlying 
islands, Quemoy and Mazu. This commitment marked the beginning of the 
usage of the "strategic ambiguity" strategy that the US still uses to this day. 
While some people have criticized this strategy, it has been effective in keeping 
the Taiwan Strait peaceful. 
Strategic ambiguity has been used in two phases. The first phase was 
when Eisenhower refused to guarantee protection of Quemoy and Mazu by 
American forces, while he guaranteed US protection of Taiwan. The reason 
Eisenhower used this strategy is that he had two objectives in mind. His main 
goal was to keep both Mao and Chiang from starting a new conflict. By not 
giving Chiang protection over Quemoy and Mazu, Eisenhower was preventing 
Chiang from becoming too confident in American protection. This move had the 
effect of discouraging Chiang from making an attempt to retake the Mainland 
without U S approval. O n the other hand, the fact that the US still protected 
Taiwan island and left the possibility of protecting Quemoy and Mazu open, the 
Mainland was deterred from launching an attack on Taiwan. 
The nature of the US security commitment to Taiwan changed in the 1970s. 
Richard Nixon's historic visit to the PRC marked the beginning of a process that 
saw the U S switch recognition from the R O C to the PRC. As the R O C began to 
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lose its legitimacy, its relationship with the US became weaker. Eventually in 
1979 the US recognized the government in Beijing as the legitimate government 
of China and broke off formal ties with Taiwan. Along with this derecognition, 
came the end of formal US protection of Taiwan. Although the US security 
commitment technically ended, it does not mean that US protection completely 
ended. In 1979 the US congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act(TRA). This act 
made US concern for Taiwan security official. The TRA states that it is U S policy 
that 
"3) to make clear that the United States decision to establish diplomatic 
relations with the People's Republic of Chin rests upon the expectation 
that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means; (4) to 
consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than 
peaceful means including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace 
and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the 
United States; (5) to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character 
and (6) to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort 
to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or 
the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan, (c) Nothing 
contained in this Act shall contravene the interest of the United States in 
human rights, especially with respect to the human rights of all the 
approximately eighteen million inhabitants of Taiwan. The preservation 
and enhancement of the human rights of all the people on Taiwan are 
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hereby reaffirmed as objectives of the United S t a t e s / ' ^ s 
The T R A provided a legal basis for continued aid to Taiwan. However, the 
Taiwan Relations Act was limited shortly after by the communique signed by the 
US and the PRC in 1982. The communique of 1982 imposed certain limits of arms 
sales and mentions that at some point US arms sales to Taiwan would be 
terminated. 
"Having in mind the foregoing statements of both sides, the United States 
Government states that it does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms 
sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative 
or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the 
establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and 
that it intends gradually to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan, leading, over a 
period of time, to a final resolution. In so stating, the United States acknowledges 
China's consistent position regarding the thorough settlement of this issue."94 
The PRC feels that over the years the US has been in violation of this 
communique because the communique was supposed to curb the US's long term 
93 U.S. Consulate in Hong Kong 
http://www.usconsulate.org.hk/ ustw/ geninfo/ tral979.htm 
94 U.S. State Department Website 
http:// usinfo.state.gov / eap / Archive 一 Index/joint—communique一1982.html 
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arms sales to Taiwan. O n the other hand, because of China's military buildup, 
the US has questioned the PRC's commitment to the communique, because in its 
view the PRC has created a situation that is not conducive to peace and 
stability.95 The seventh point of the communique states that "The development 
of United States - China relations is not only in the interests of the two peoples 
but also conducive to peace and stability in the world. 
Also, at the heart of the disagreement concerning arms sales, is the nature of 
US domestic politics. To the PRC, international law tnimps domestic law in this 
situation, and therefore the US must honor the communique. Some on the 
American side claim that the Communique of 1982 was signed by the executive 
branch of the government, while the TRA was passed by congress, and therefore 
the obligations of the T R A outweigh the obligations of the communiqu台.96ln a 
limited fashion, American weapons sales to Taiwan continue. Often, the prospect 
of buying American weapons has created debate in the Taiwanese government. 
The more pro-independence factions of the government tend to support the 
purchase of American arms, while groups that support a "one China" policy 
tend to support limiting the purchases. 
The possibility of US protection of Taiwan still exists. However, its form has 
changed. The US has withdrawn its previous defense commitment to Taiwan 
95 John P. McClaren. "U.S. Arms Sales To Taiwan: Implications For The Future of 




and replaced it with a different version. Instead of making a firm commitment to 
defend Taiwan island like it previously did, the US has simply modified its 
policy of strategic ambiguity. The US will basically side against the instigator in 
the event of a cross-strait crisis. It is presumed that if the PRC were to launch an 
unprovoked attack against Taiwan, the US would come into the conflict on 
Taiwan's side. O n the other hand, should the attack be provoked by Taiwan, the 
US would stay out of the conflict. This policy of strategic ambiguity has received 
both praise and criticism. What makes the policy complicated is that it is not 
clear what Taiwan would have to do to incite an attack. "In the case of the 
Taiwan issue, successful deterrence requires that the US achieve a dual 
deterrence objective. That is, the US must not only prevent China from attacking 
Taiwan, but it must also discourage Taiwan from provoking China. Can the US 
deter both China and Taiwan from making a move that will upset the peaceful 
status quo by simply choosing to make a weak or strong commitment? 
Intuitively, if the US's commitment is too low, then China will, like the extended 
deterrence situation, still choose to attack Taiwan. If the US's commitment level 
is too high, however, then Taiwan will, under the blanket coverage of the US, 
choose to provoke China. Because that is not clear, it is also not clear what the US 
would consider to be provocation and what would be considered an unprovoked 
attack. At this point strategic ambiguity helps the US maintain a policy of dual 
deterrence and dual reassurance".97 
97 Emerson Niou and Brett V Benson. "Comprehending Strategic Ambiguity: US 
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This strategic ambiguity strategy has received criticism. It has been been 
argued that the best strategy for the US to use would be to simply let Taiwan 
have whatever weapons it may need for its defense and then drop any pretext of 
a security commitment. Ted Galen Carpenter explained that the while Americans 
admire the progress made by the Taiwanese and Taiwan is of some economic 
importance to the US, Taiwan's independence from the Mainland is not of vital 
interest to the U S， 
Over the years the US security commitment to Taiwan has been a major 
issue in Sino-US relations. Weapons sales during the 1990s increased. President 
George Bush Sr. approved the sale of 150 f-16 fighter jets to Taiwan in 1992. 
President Clinton also allowed arms sales to continue^, and it seems that arms 
sales are not likely to stop in the near future. In fact, the most potent force 
limiting current arms sales to Taiwan may be the elements in the Taiwanese 
government that oppose the arms deals supported by the DPP and President 
Chen. In April 2001, George W . Bush pledged that the US would do "whatever it 
takes" to help defend Taiwan in the event of an attack from the Mainland. It 
seemed for a short while as if President Bush had backed away from a position of 
ambiguity. However, before the Taiwanese election in 2003, Bush seemed to back 
Security Commitaient To Taiwan." Nov. 12,2001. 
http://www.diike.edu/~niou/teaching/strategic%20ambiguity.pdf 
98 Ted Galen Carpenter. "Let Taiwan Defend Itself." August 24, 1998 The Cato Institute. 
99 Dennis Hickey. "U.S. Taiwan Friendship Still Strong" Taipei Times. Thursday-
June 26,2003. 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/ News/ editorials/ archives/2003/ 06/ 26/20030568 
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down from his earlier remarks in an effort to keep Chen Shuibian from angering 
China with his intentions to hold referendums.扣OThese referendums tend to 
create tensions in the Taiwan Strait. 
In light of the U.S. security commitment to Taiwan, the ASL is a piece of 
legislation that has the potential to impact the U.S.-Taiwan relationship. 
However, in the period following the ASL, it appears as though its impact on the 
U.S. security commitment has been negligible. American military concerns have 
continued to exist in the Middle East rather than in East Asia. 
I 
100 Michael D. Swaine. "Trouble in Taiwan" Foreign Affairs March-April 2004. 
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/ 
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Chapter Five: Analysis of the Anti-Secession Law 
The Anti-Secession Law was adopted by the Third Session of the Tenth 
National People's Congress of the PRC and went into effect as soon as it was 
adopted on the of March 2005. The Law consists of 10 articles. English 
language media coverage of the ASL has mostly focused on Article 8, which is 
the Article that lays out the possibility of Mainland military action in certain 
situations. This article is extremely important due to the potential impact of a 
cross-strait conflict on worldwide security. However, a thorough look at the ASL 
shows that the law is about more than just preventing secession. The ASL in 
some respects is a representation of China's Taiwan policy. The articles of the 
ASL lay out areas where China feels steps should be taken in order to improve 
cross-strait relations. In this sense, the ASL could also be viewed as promoting 
better relations across the Taiwan Strait. One possible flaw that exists within the 
ASL is its lack of specificity. It sets a general policy to improve cross-strait ties in 
certain ways and puts into law China's willingness to use non-peaceful means to 
end the cross-strait dispute, however, it does not delineate exactly what Taiwan 
secession means. However, this may also allow the PRC a high degree of 
flexibility. Since the PRC already has no real control over Taiwan, in certain ways 
Taiwan has already seceded. Basically, the issue over what constitutes "Taiwan 
independence" has not been settled by the passage of the ASL. 
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One point worthy of discussion concerning the ASL is its name. While the 
naming of the law makes its focus the prevention of what China sees as the 
secession of Taiwan, the ASL is not just a law against secession. So, why did 
China not choose to name it the "pro-unification law" or perhaps give it a 
different name altogether? It is important to note, that in 1999 Zhang Nianchi, a 
Mainland expert on the Taiwan issue, proposed a "unification law". However, a 
law that focuses on unification may have to lay out a specific plan as to how to 
implement it. Because the Taiwanese have consistently rejected unification 
under the "one country, two systems" policy, unification would most likely need 
to take place under a different system. At this time, it is doubtful that the two 
parties could agree on a system that would lead to mutual satisfaction. As 
political scientist Zhu Zhiqun wrote, "The passage of a new law regulating 
regulations between Taiwan and China is indeed a testament to the flexibility of 
current Chinese leaders to face reality and change a failing policy" .loi By putting 
the emphasis on preventing secession, Chinese leaders are proscribing a certain 
action, but leaving the door open for others. Additionally, with the threat of 
military action, as well as the offer of improved relations, the PRC has illustrated 
exactly how it will implement its plan of preventing secession. The question of 
how to unify the two sides could be handled in the future. The drawback of 
101 Zhiqun Zhu. "Secession Bill Shows China's Wisdom/' December 21, 2004. 
http: / / www.atimes.com/atiiiies / China / FL21Ad02.html 
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naming it the Anti-Secession Law is that the name would likely carry a negative 
connotation in comparison to a "unification law". 
Furthermore, the wording of the ASL's name is interesting because it 
presupposes that Taiwan is currently a part of China, despite the fact that China 
is pursuing "re-unification". In order for Taiwan to legally "secede" it must be a 
part of a larger legal entity. By labeling the forces pushing for "Taiwan 
independence" as secessionist, the PRC is reinforcing its view that the Taiwan 
matter is an internal Chinese affair. Taiwanese leaders contradict the idea that 
Taiwan is a part of the P R C They believe that they are a sovereign country under 
the name of the Republic of China. 
The first article of the ASL lays out China's goal of guarding its 
sovereignty and protecting its territorial integrity. China's motivation for 
regaining Taiwan is that the Chinese feel that Taiwan is an inalienable part of 
China that must not be severed from the Mainlandi02. Additionally, it points out 
that the ASL's purpose is to oppose the forces that promote "Taiwan 
independence" and to bring about a peaceful unification of the two sides. 
Article 2 repeats some of the points made in the first article. It repeats 
China's intention to not allow Taiwan independence and repeats the intention to 
safeguard territorial integrity. However, in this article, the ASL lays out the belief 
in the "one China" principle. It should be noted that the ASL mentions that there 
i。2 Qimao Chen. "The Taiwan Issue and Sino-U.S. Relations: A PRC View, Asian 
Survey, Vol. 27, No. 11 Nov. 1987 p. 1161. 
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is only one China and that the Mainland and Taiwan are both a part of this 
"China". However, the ASL uses the term "zhongguo"(中國，which means 
"China") rather than using "Zhonghua renmin gonghegiio"(中華人民共和國） 
which refers to the PRC. 
The fact that the ASL does not explicitly state that Taiwan and the 
Mainland both belong to the P R C supports the idea that the ASL is ultimately 
aimed at restoring and maintaining the 1992 consensus of "One China, T w o 
Interpretations". The acceptance of the "one China" principle is of great 
importance to Beijing. Its willingness to negotiate about the future of cross-strait 
relations depends upon all parties involved agreeing on this principle. 
Article 3 of the ASL clarifies h o w Beijing views the nature of the current 
situation. It mentions that the "Taiwan question" is a still unresolved issue 
dating back to the Chinese Civil War. It then proceeds to say that solving this 
issue is an internal Chinese affair. The Chinese government has had to deal with 
interference on the part of the U S in the past. U S interference in the Taiwan 
situation has traditionally been criticized by China because the issue is seen as an 
internal matter by the PRC. Generally the P R C has sought to curtail any outside 
interference at all in the situation. 
Article 4 lays out the desire on the part of the Chinese people to unify 
Taiwan with the Mainland. The fiftiti article of the ASL mentions that the 
Mainland "shall do its utmost with m a x i m u m sincerity to achieve a peaceful 
reunification". It also brings up the fact that once unification has taken place. 
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Taiwan will enjoy a certain amount of autonomy as well as practice a different 
system from the Mainland (Taiwan would not be subject to Communist laws). 
Historically, China had offered Taiwan unification under a "one country, two 
systems" policy similar to the one it used in the cases of Hong Kong and Macau, 
which are Special Administrative Regions of the PRC. 
Article 6 lays out a series of measures that the Mainland will take in order 
to maintain "peace and stability" in the Taiwan Strait and in hopes of promoting 
cross-strait relations. It mentions five measures. The first one, which is meant to 
encourage personal exchanges, has already been put into effect. As other 
chapters discuss, shortly after the passage of the ASL, the K M T received 
invitations to visit the Mainland. The second measure to be taken by the P R C 
would be the promotion of the three links ("sflntowg"三通)as well as promoting 
greater economic ties. In recent years, there has been some development in the 
area of the three links, which consist of air, postal, and shipping links. The 
Chinese N e w Year holiday periods in 2005 and 2006 saw direct chartered flights 
between Taiwan and the Mainland. The third measure discusses Beijing's 
intention to encourage cross-strait exchanges in areas of "education, science, 
technology, culture, health and sports, and work together to carry forward the 
proud Chinese cultural traditions." The fourth measure is meant to encourage 
cross-strait cooperation in dealing with crime. The fifth measure is quite general. 
It reads that the state will take measures to "encourage and facilitate other 
activities that are conducive to peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits and 
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stronger cross-Straits relations" .lOSThis section of the ASL does not specify 
specific actions that will be taken. It encourages support for the improvement of 
cross-strait relations and basically lays out general areas where relations should 
be improved. 
The seventh article begins by mentioning that when the two parties 
negotiate they will be on "equal footing". This statement is likely there to assure 
Taiwan that if negotiations on the issue of unification take place, Taiwan would 
not be in a position of inferiority. Whether or not that would really be the case is 
unknown. The PRC continues with its fast military buildup and continues to 
grow economically. In light of the fact that China has more international 
recognition and is a member of the United Nations Security Council, it enjoys 
significantly more power and influence than Taiwan. In this situation, since both 
parties do not have equal power and influence it would be unlikely that Taiwan 
could enter any negotiation for unification on an equal footing with the PRC. 
Article 7 continues to state that the consultations and negotiations can be 
conducted in "steps and phases and with flexible and varied modalities". It 
continues to state that the two sides may negotiate on certain matters. These 
matters are 1) to officially end the state of hostilities in the Taiwan Strait, 2) to 
map out the development of cross-strait relations, 3) steps that would lead to 
unification, 4) "the political status of the Taiwanese authorities", 5) room for 
103 ASL, Article 6, clause 5 
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Taiwan to operate internationally in a way that is compatible with its status, 6) 
"other matters concerning the achievement of peaceful national reunification". 
While article 6 is meant to encourage better relations across the Taiwan 
Strait, article 7 is meant to put out a framework for negotiations on unification. I 
believe it is important to note that this article is not very specific on the matters it 
is addressing. For example, the sixth matter that the PRC mentions is "other 
matters" concerning unification. The vagueness of the ASL in this case may be 
attributed to the fact that the P R C leaders are trying to show flexibility. By not 
laying out very specific measures, the P R C is leaving the matter open to be 
determined later. 
Article 8 is the article that has been mostly represented in the media from 
m y observation. It is the article that authorizes "non-peaceful" means to stop 
"secession" from taking place. The ASL states that should secessionist forces "act 
under any name or by any means" to cause Taiwan's secession, or should any 
"major incidents entailing Taiwan's secession from China occur", or if there 
remains no possibility for peaceful unification, the P R C will use non-peaceful 
and other measures to maintain its territorial integrity. The second paragraph of 
article 8 authorizes the State Council and Military Commission to decide on and 
execute the actions laid out in Article 8 and to "promptly report to the Standing 
Committee of the National People's Congress〃(全國人民代表大會常務委員會). 
Article 8 displays the means which the P R C is willing to use to enforce its 
anti-secessionist stance. As it continues to build up its military, the ease of such 
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enforcement is likely to increase. However, it is important to note, that this article 
does not lay out a clear action which might provoke non-peaceful action on the 
part of the PRC. Additionally, article 8 does not define exactly what non-peaceful 
means would be used. According to certain figures, the PRC has at least 700 
missiles aimed at Taiwan.^^This would suggest that a military attack would be a 
likely approach. However, it is important to note that the meaning of ''non-
peaceful means" in this situation is vague. In m y view, this vagueness allows the 
PRC a degree of flexibility. 
Article 9 explains that in the event that the PRC would use non-peaceful 
means, it would do its best to minimize the losses that would occur as a result. It 
also says that it would protect the property of "Taiwan compatriots" in other 
parts of China. The final article of the ASL, article 10 states that the ASL is to 
come into effect on the day of its promulgation. 
The Future of the ASL itself 
It is possible that the ASL may see many changes in the future. Because 
the issue between Taiwan and the Mainland is not settled, the law may be 
amended as needed. According to the Taipei Times, China is currently in the 
process of amending the ASL. This new amendment, if made, would be meant to 
authorize arrests of those people who support Taiwan independence. According 
to the Taipei Times, "the new clauses will list penalties for Taiwanese nationals 
104 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4819312.stm 
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who advocate Taiwanese independence or engage in separatist activities"i05At 
this point it remains to be seen exactly what amendments will be made to the 
ASL. However, if the Taipei Times report turns out to be true, it will be pertinent 
to see if the amendments have any affect on the way the way the ASL has been 
received. 
The wording of the Anti-Secession Law makes it apparent that the PRC 
was intent on allowing itself a great degree of flexibility in resolving the Taiwan 
issue. The ASL does not specifically state a legitimate government of "China", 
but rather states that Taiwan and the Mainland both are a part of "China". 
Furthermore, by not laying out exactly what Taiwan must do in order to provoke 
a Mainland attack, the PRC has left that decision for a later time. 




Chapter Six: Reasons Behind the Passage of the Anti-Secession Law 
With the gradual democratization process that had begun in the 1970s, the 
idea of a Taiwanese consciousness became much more prevalent throughout 
Taiwanese society. This prevalence has been expressed in a numbers of ways. 
The rise of Li Denghui, a Taiwanese born President and his actions in regard to 
China, the rise of the DPP opposition party, and the victory of Chen Shuibian 
and Annette Lu in recent Taiwanese national elections all illustrate a 
fundamental change in policy. The previous policy regarding cross-strait 
relations in Taiwan, which existed mainly from 1949 up through the 1970s was to 
plan for the eventual return to the Mainland^^^. In this context the idea of a "one-
China" policy would never have to be questioned because the K M T claimed to 
be the legitimate government not only of Taiwan, but also of the entire Mainland. 
While the dispute would be over which government legitimately should exercise 
authority over China, Taiwan's status as a part of China was not questioned by 
either government. 
However, the changes that occurred after the death of Chiang Jingguo 
were of concern to the government on the Mainland. The process of 
democratization on Taiwan speeded up. While reviewing reasons for the Taiwan 
Straits Crisis of the mid 1990's Taifa Yu wrote "Clearly, China's decision to resort 
106 Ralph N. Clough "The Enduring Influence of the Republic of China on Taiwan 
Today." The China Quarterly, no. 148, Special Issue: Contemporary Taiwan Dec. 
1996 P.1061. 
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to military coercion was due largely to its rising concern that Taiwan's 
democratization and diplomatic offensives were rendering its strategy of 
national unification ineffective/'^ o^ There are a number of possible reasons that 
China would view the democratization of Taiwan as counterproductive. The first 
reason is that in a democracy the elected government is accountable to the 
populace. As time has passed, the proportion of Taiwanese referred to as 
"Mainlanders" has decreased. These Mainlanders are the people who descend 
from the group of three million that came over to Taiwan along with Chiang Kai 
Shek. This group has been traditionally the base of support for the K M T party. 
Additionally, China would have cultural concerns. If Taiwan is democratic and 
the PRC is not, the Taiwanese people would be less likely to have the desire to 
unify with the Mainland. "Taiwan's democratization has greatly widened the 
gap between the two Chinas and, in spite of the PRC's booming economic 
development, had clearly made impossible not only a German-style unification 
of the Chinese nation but also the successful implementation of Deng Xiaoping's 
"one country, two systems" formula: the overwhelming majority of the 
Taiwanese are opposed to any unification with the PRC and, more dependant on 
its public opinion, the Taipei government has no choice but to express and 
107 Taifa Yu. "Taiwanese Democracy Under Threat: Impact and Limit Of Chinese 
Military Coercion." Pacific Affairs Vol. 70 No. 1, Spring 1997 p. 8 . 
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defend this view" .108 For some Taiwanese, unification would only be possible in 
the event that China's political system becomes a multi-party democracy. The 
Mainland has traditionally criticized this stance. In 1998 Tang Shubei, a senior 
Mainland negotiator with Taiwan said "I think people who stipulate the social 
system and democratic construction as preconditions for reunification actually 
wish to delay the reunification process/'io^ This quote illustrates the Mainland 
Chinese fear that Taiwanese democracy goes against their aim of unification. 
In addition to the reasons stated above, I believe the case of Hong Kong 
also illustrates the Mainland's apprehensiveness toward democratic reforms. 
Despite the desire to use the "One Country,Two Systems" model that has been 
applied to Hong Kong and Macau as a possible model for reunification with 
Taiwan, the central government in Beijing has constantly had a hand in Hong 
Kong's internal affairs. In a statement before a US Senate subcommittee hearing 
concerning the perspectives of democracy in Hong Kong, John J. Tkacik Jr. said 
in 2004 that "China has begun the process of imposing its defense, internal 
security and intelligence priorities on Hong Kong via the so-called "Article 23" 
legislation. Finally the idea of "Hong Kong People Ruling Hong Kong" has been 
debased by Beijing's reneging on the spirit of its pledges in the Basic Law to 
i08jean-Pierre Cabestan. "Taiwan's Mainland Policy: Normalization; Yes, 
Reunification, Later." The China Quarterly, no. 148, Special Issue: Contemporary 
Taiwan, December 1996 p. 1261. 
109 "Taiwan Democracy Stance Delays Reunification-China." Reuters, December 
28,1998 taiwansecurity.org. 
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implement "universal suffrage" in the period "after 2007".noThe key point being 
made here is that the PRC has not been supportive of the movement toward 
democracy in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The attitude of the 
Chinese government has even led to mass protests aimed at the central 
government by people in Hong Kong in favor of democracy. Since the PRC 
government claims Taiwan to be a rogue province, it would be inconsistent for 
them to be content with the democratic reforms made on Taiwan. 
、 
It should be noted that democracy in Taiwan has had a number of 
important effects on Taiwanese society. According to Yuan Peng, there have been 
four important results of Taiwan's democratization which have had an impact on 
cross-strait ties. The democratization of Taiwan has led to debate over the 
independence/ unification issue. It has also changed the nature of the US-
Taiwanese relationship. Instead of having a relationship simply based on 
common interests, the US and Taiwan now share the common value of 
democracy that is not shared by the P R C Furthermore, issues such as 
democratization and economic development, sovereignty, security, and dignity 
have proven to be fertile areas for de-sinification talk. This has proved to hinder 
consensus regarding the "one China" issue. The 1991 declaration by Li Denghui 
and the PRC of the ending of the Chinese Civil War along with the victory of the 
opposition party in 2000 in the presidential election ended any possibility that 
110 John J. Tkacik jr. "Perspectives on Democracy in Hong Kong" March 4,2004. 
http:// www.heritage.org/Research/ AsiaandthePacific/ tst081104d.cfm 
80 
the CCP and K M T could together find a solution that connected with the civil 
war.m 112 
It is apparent that one of the major changes that occurred in Taiwan that 
has irked the government in Bejing has been the rise of democracy there. 
However, there are other issues that have also been prevalent in leading up to 
the passage of the Law. Among those issues were certain events that took place 
during the tenure of former Taiwanese President, Li Denghui. Towards the 
beginning of his tenure, cross-Strait relations were actually improving. This 
improvement in relations was multi-faceted. Economic ties between Taiwan and 
the Mainland grew, as did the number of Taiwanese who were able to travel to 
Mainland China. Cross-Strait discourse occurred in 1992 and then continued in 
1993. In 1993 representatives from both sides of the Taiwan Strait met in 
Singapore to discuss the future status of cross-Strait ties. This meeting produced 
an agreement concerning the state of cross-Strait relations. Both sides agreed to a 
policy of "one China, two interpretations". However, this situation did not last 
through the mid 1990s. 
111 I believe this issue is of importance to the government in Beijing. Article 3 of 
the Anti-Secession law states that "The Taiwan Question is one that is left over 
from China's civil war of the late 1940s. Solving the Taiwan question and 
achieving national reunification is China's internal affair, which subjects it to no 
interefence by outside forces" The grouping of the point of non-interference with 
the historical issue of the civil war illustrates tiiat the PRC uses the Civil War 
issue partly to justify its opposition to the interference of other countries in cross-
strait relations. 
112 Peng Yuan. "The Taiwan Issue in the Context of N e w Sino-U.S. Strategic 
Cooperation." Summer 2004, The Brookings Institute, Center for Northeast Asian 
Policy Studies, www.brookings.edu 
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In chapter three I discussed the granting of an American visa to Li 
Denghui that ignited cross-strait tensions. The ensuing missile exercises and the 
reaction on the part of the United States represented the underlying potential for 
cross-strait conflict. 
The PRC has maintained a policy of using military threats to keep the 
Taiwanese from moving too far toward what they view as independence. 
However, at the same time, the PRC has used other means to both keep the 
Taiwanese from declaring independence and to encourage the prospect of 
unification. Beijing basically employs two different strategies which are both 
aimed at achieving the same goal. In his article concerning Beijing's strategy in 
the Taiwan Strait, Sui Sheng Zhao wrote "Beijing's strategy of national 
reunification with Taiwan has been a mixture of military coercion and peaceful 
inducement. Coercive strategy relies primarily upon the use or the threat of use 
of force. It could take the form of military actions aiming at the conquest of 
Taiwan, or military brinkmanship using military force in an exemplary or 
demonstrative manner. In contrast, peaceful inducement appeals to cross-strait 
political negotiations and economic and cultural exchanges to bind Taiwan's 
hands from seeking independence and to build goodwill and momentum for 
eventual national reunification. And yet, military coercion and peaceful 
inducement are two sides of the same coin, coercive logic is embedded in 
Bejing's inducements, which can thus be termed "peaceful offense". Beijing has 
placed priority on either coercion or inducement at different times according to 
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changes in China's domestic politics and Beijing's perception of the international 
environment and Taiwan's internal politics/'^ i^ What is illustrated here is that 
based on internal Taiwanese developments, Beijing's attitude tends to change. 
Li Denghui once again proved capable of giving rise to concern on the 
Mainland when he called for direct elections in 1996. China timed missile 
exercises to coincide with the elections as a warning to the Taiwanese. Li 
Denghui continued to create situations that ignited tensions toward the end of 
his tenure. In July 1999, Li described the state of relations between Taiwan and 
China as being "special state-to-state [relations] “. This statement drew the ire of 
the Mainland Chinese. After his comments were made, Mainland media hurled 
insults at 
After these events occurred, the PRC felt it had to change its policy. Yu 
Taifa summarized the main causes of the need for China to change its Taiwan 
policy, and what those changes were. "Several troubling developments in 
Taiwan prompted China to review its policy of suspending quasi-official links 
with Taiwan. These developments included:!) A steady increase in separatist 
sentiments; 2) Gradual erosion of popular support for the ruling K M T and 
increase in support for the pro-independence DPP; 3) Modernization of Taiwan's 
113 Suisheng Zhao. "Military Coercion and Peaceful Offence: Beijing's Strategy of 
National Reunification with Taiwan." Pacific Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 4, Special Issue: 
Taiwan Strait, Winter 1999-2000 p. 495. 




armed forces as a result of the deployment of advanced weapons from France 
and the U.S., which would bolster its will to reject unification; 4) Taiwan's drift 
farther apart from national unification as evidenced by proposed changes at the 
National Development Conference; and 5) The expansion of the U.S.-Japanese 
security treaty to include Taiwan within areas adjacent to Japan that both nations 
would collaborate to defend."i30 Furthermore, previously when the Chinese 
government had anticipated that in light of military coercion the wealthy 
Taiwanese would emigrate and the rest of the Taiwanese would respond by 
seeking unification out of fear of the Chinese threat, the Chinese were actually 
confronted with an increase in separatist sentiment. 
Yu Taifa continued with a discussion of the strategy Beijing would take. 
"To prod Taiwan to enter negotiation, China adjusted some aspects of the 
strategy of national unification formulated during the Deng are: 1) Emphasizing 
"one country, two systems" as a reasonable solution to the problem of national 
unification; 2) accelerating Taiwan's diplomatic isolation; 3) Enhancing Taiwan's 
economic dependency on China as a place for investment and trade; and 4) 
confronting Taiwan with the specter of a military showdown."ii5 
Beijing's fears of the DPP gaining power were realized during the 
Taiwanese presidential election in 2000. Before the election, Beijing attempted to 
curb Chen Shuibian's momentum. "The P R C s State Council issued a white 
130 Taifa Yu. "Relations Between Taiwan and China after the Missile Crisis: 
Toward Reconciliation?" Pacific Affairs, Volume 72, No. 1, Spring 1999 p. 39-55. 
115 Ibid. 
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paper one month before the polls declaring three conditions under which Beijing 
would launch military attacks at the island. Known as "the three 'ifs',〃 these 
conditions are 1) if Taiwan declares itself independent, 2) if Taiwan is invaded 
and occupied by foreign countries, and 3) if Taipei refuses indefinitely to conduct 
negotiations on the issue of u n i f i c a t i o n . " T h i s election saw two candidates, 
Lian Zhan and James Soong basically split the K M T vote. Lian Zhan was the 
official candidate of the KMT, but Soong was able attract a large number of K M T 
voters. This split led to the victory of Chen Shuibian, who was the DPP 
candidate, with only 39 percent of the vote. The victory of Chen proved to be a 
milestone in Taiwan's history. He was the first opposition candidate to win in the 
presidential election. However, because the platform of his party is pro-
independence, Beijing was automatically distrustful of Chen. For example, on 
December 11,1999 before the election took place the Chinese ambassador to the 
U.S., Li Zhaoxing said that all candidates with the exception of Chen would be 
acceptable winners of the Taiwanese election.ii7Some other comments made by 
Chinese officials along with the white paper actually had the effect of giving 
Chen a slight boost at the poUs.9 Chen had made certain conciliatory gestures to 
Beijing, such as promising not to declare independence, not to insert Li 
116 T.Y Wang. ''Cross-Strait Relations after the 2000 Election in Taiwan: Changing 
Tactics In a N e w Reality/' Asian Survey Volume 41, No. 5, Sept.-〇ct. 2005 pp. 
716-717. 
117 Taiwanese Government Website 
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Denghui's special "state to state" relationship with the Mainland into the 
constitution, and not to hold a referendum on the independence and unification 
issue. This speech is known as the "five noes" in reference to the five main 
things Chen pledged not to do. However, these actions did not have the desired 
effect, partly because Chen is restricted by his party's platform and could not 
make a commitment for ultimate unification with the Mainland. Beijing made the 
acceptance of a one-China principle the ultimate condition for any cross-strait 
talks with Chen's government, us 
During his first term, President Chen used certain tactics that led to 
Beijing remaining concerned. For example, in December of 2003 Chen threatened 
to renege on the "five noes" that he mentioned in his inauguration speech. "The 
'five noes, promise I made in m y inauguration speech is conditional upon 
Communist China's not intending to take military action against Taiwan.. .But 
During the past three years, Beijing has put in place more ballistic missiles 
targeting Taiwan, expanded its military expenditure on a large scale and 
repeatedly threatened Taiwan…All of these [actions] have clearly displayed its 
intention of using force against Taiwan.. .Therefore, m y 'five noes' actually cease 
to exist while China wields the threat of military action. The reason I still pledge 
to firmly maintain the 'five noes' is because I a m willing to make a conqession 
with the other side of the Taiwan Strait/' Chen continued by saying that if China 
118 Yu Shan W u . "Taiwan in 2000: Managing the Aftershocks of Power Transfer." 
Asian Survey, Volume 41, No. 1, "A Survey of Asia in 2000". Jan-Feb. 2001 p. 43-
45. 
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would launch any missiles into the Taiwan Strait as it had in 1996 he would 
revoke three 'noes'.n9As I previously mentioned, China's actions before the 2000 
election actually helped Chen garner support. This point was not lost on Chen 
and he has used the "China card" to gain support at times. As Chen's popularity 
dropped he brought up certain issues such as referendums that would draw fire 
from China.i20Chen In doing so he had hoped to rally his supporters before he 
ran for re-election in 2004. 
As the incumbent candidate, Chen was again able to achieve victory in the 
Taiwanese elections in 2004 following an assassination attempt directed at him 
the day before the election took place. After his victory Chen announced that he 
would move ahead with certain constitutional reforms. Reforming the Taiwanese 
constitution is not looked upon favorably by Beijing. Beijing fears that possible 
constitutional changes in Taiwan could constitute a declaration of independence 
that may force it to take action. However, in an attempt to allay fears about the 
implications of his second victory toward cross-strait security, Chen announced 
that he would not make sensitive changes to the constitution. In his speech Chen 
said "I a m fully aware that consensus has yet to be reached on issues related to 
national sovereignty, territory and the subject of 
unification/independence ...Therefore, let m e explicitly propose that these 
119 ''Chen Tells China He May revoke 'Five Noes' Pledge/' Taipei Times, 
December 23,2003. Taiwansecurity.org. 




particular issues be excluded from the present constitutional re-engineering 
project". His speech did very little to allay Chinese concerns. Giving his opinion 
about Chen's speech, Zhu Weidong, of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
in Beijing said that "He may have adjusted his tactics and eased his rhetoric, but 
w e know the U.S. was very concerned about the speech and he was under 
pressure…How far he will adjust his tactics and whether he will do what he says 
are still not clear/'^ i^ 
China has made it apparent that she is willing to postpone a final 
resolution of the cross-strait issue for quite some time.122 However, should China 
put off the issue of unification too long, it would run the risk of allowing Taiwan 
to drift too far apart in terms of culture and ideology. However, the ASL may 
help provide a framework for a possible future agreement. Using the ASL as a 
starting point for negotiations may allow H u Jintao who has only recently come 
to power, some room to maneuver and at the same time not be seen as being too 
soft on Taiwan. H u has displayed his willingness to negotiate and has also 
expressed his willingness to use force in order to stop Taiwan from declaring 
independence. In this situation it is important to look at H u Jintao's predecessor, 
Jiang Zemin. When Li Denghui visited Cornell and made his inflammatory 
speech there, Jiang Zemin was forced to satisfy the hardliners in his government 
121 Edward Cody. "Taiwan President Pledges to Hold Off Formal Independence." 
The Washington Post, M a y 20,2004. 
122 Kenneth Lieberthal. "Preventing a War Over Taiwan/' Foreign Affairs, 
March/April 2005. 
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by allowing military exercises in the Taiwan Strait. It was in the wake of this 
situation that Jiang was able to emerge with his own leadership position being 
vindicated.i23The fact that Jiang was able to truly consolidate his leadership 
allowed him to exercise more authority in dealing with both Taiwan and the 
Unites States. "Only after Jiang had consolidated his power in 1997 and 1998 and 
had pushed Premier Li Peng to the margins was he able to take risks on his 
own"悩It seems that H u Jintao's situation may be similar. Being seen as too soft 
toward Taiwan could prove detrimental to any Chinese leader. The leader would 
not be seen as properly protecting China's territorial i n t e g r i t y i^ s By taking a firm 
stance on Taiwan and making it clear that he is willing to be tough if necessary 
H u may have freed himself up for future negotiations. 
The Anti-Secession Law mostly serves as a quiet warning. The Chinese 
government coupled the Anti-Secession Law with an invitation for notable 
members of the K M T party, as well as the People's First Party to come to China. 
Additionally, the wording of ASL is not very harsh. It does not proscribe any-
specific actions, and it expresses the Chinese desire for a peaceful solution to the 
cross-strait issue. The strategy being used here is different from the one used in 
the 1990s. Instead of using missiles and strong insults, the Chinese government 
123 parris H. Chang. "Changing of the Guard" The Chinese Journal No. 45 January 
2001, p. 41. 
David M . Lampton. Same Bed Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations 
1989-2000. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University Of California Press, 2001. 
125 Qimao Chen. "The Taiwan Strait Crisis: Its Crux and Solutions." Asian Survey, 
Volume 36 number 11, November 1996 p. 1059. 
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simply formalized the position it already had taken. However, the important part 
of this strategy involved the Mainland visits by the Taiwanese opposition 
officials. These visits limited the impact of the message being sent by ASL. They 
demonstrate China's willingness to negotiate. This tactic was likely used in order 
to help quell any anti-PRC sentiment caused by the ASL. Basically, the ASL is a 
way for China to use the "military coercion" approach without alienating the 
Taiwanese people and driving them further into the DPP camp. It has been noted 
that China's restraint in this situation may also simply relate to China's rising 
good opinion among many people as well as the intent to retain a good image 
before the 2008 Olympic games in Beijing. An editorial in the Taipei Times that 
discussed China's referral of the Taiwan issue to the United Nations suggests 
that the reasons for China's current strategy could be the one I just brought up, 
or that China is attempting to further alienate Chen Shuibian, this time by 
putting him in the position of being a "trouble maker".126Additionally, the 
prospect of Chen being seen as troublesome could be helpful for China. Since the 
U S security commitment to Taiwan is based on the idea that the US would only 
defend Taiwan in the event of an unprovoked attack, portraying Chen as a 
troublemaker could help the PRC prevent US intervention. If the PRC attacked 
Taiwan and the US refused to help Taiwan, it is possible that the US could lose 
credibility with its other security commitments in East Asia. However, 
126 Richard Hazeldine. "Just what exactly is Beijing Playing at?" Taipei Times, 
March 7, 2006. www.taipeitimes.com. 
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portraying Chen as someone who is merely provoking China could possibly give 
the U S a way out of defending Taiwan without jeopardizing its credibility. 
Taiwanese Public Opinion and the ASL 
Taiwanese public opinion is of great importance in the cross-strait 
situation because Taiwan's leaders are elected democratically. One of the most 
important issues, if not the most important issue in Taiwanese politics is the 
independence/unification issue. Most Taiwanese currently favor maintaining the 
status quo. As of 2004, there were some Taiwanese(around 25 percent) that 
support independence from China regardless of the consequences. O n the other 
hand, there were some(around 27 percent) that were not in favor of 
independence. These two groups are committed to their stance on the 
independence/unification issue. However, around 46 percent of the population 
would favor independence under favorable conditions. Additionally, around 45 
percent of T^wanese would favor unification under favorable conditions. In 
other words, the plurality of Taiwanese could potentially support either 
independence or unification. Additionally, surveys indicate that there is a 
correlation between the threat China poses and the desire for independence. The 
more someone believes Taiwan faces a real threat from China, the less likely they 
are to support independence. Furthermore, the people that support 
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unconditional independence are more likely to believe that the US will interfere 
in the event of a cross-strait war.^ 27 
After examining the correlations to public opinion in Taiwan, it makes 
sense that the PRC would choose to pass a law like the ASL. By passing the ASL, 
Beijing has made it clear that it is not only willing, but could possibly be legally 
bound to go to war in the event that they deem Taiwan as having gone too far. 
Thus, the ASL is another part of China's military coercion strategy. Additionally, 
the ASL could end up enforcing a belief that if China totally commits to war in 
the Taiwan Strait, that the U.S. would be unwilling to get involved. In this sense 
the ASL could be viewed as deterring the U.S. from interfering in a cross-strait 
military conflict. 
Conclusion 
The questions that are important to ask regarding the anti-secession law 
are not just concerning why it was passed in the first place, but also w h y the P R C 
chose to pass the law when it did. There have been periods when cross-strait 
relations have been sour, however those periods did not see the implementation 
of an Anti-Secession law or any similar law. The reason the law was passed now 
rather than before is that while the leaders in Beijing felt the need to warn 
127 Emerson Niou. "Understanding Taiwan Independence and Its Policy Implications." 
Asian Survey Vol. 44，No. 4 July-August 2004. 
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Taiwan, which is something they have constantly done, they needed to do so in a 
way that would not alienate the very people they wished to win over, the people 
of Taiwan. Additionally, the election and re-election of DPP leaders were a cause 
of concern for PRC leaders. Other factors that could have contributed to the 
law's implementation are the need for a new generation of leaders to establish 
their credentials as not being soft on Taiwan. This may aid the leaders in Beijing 
in future negotiations with Taiwan by providing more room for flexibility. 
Furthermore, the ASL's implementation was timed to coincide with high level 
meetings between the K M T and the CCP on the Mainland. This sequence of 
events illustrates the new strategy being used by Beijing in dealing with Taiwan. 
、 
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Chapter Seven: Effects of the ASL 
The prospect of the Anti-Secession Law at first gave rise to some anti-PRC 
sentiment in Taiwan. With the support of President Chen, many Taiwanese took 
to the streets in order to voice their opposition to the ASL. In March of 2005 
hundreds of thousands of Taiwanese marched to protest the law^ s^. The 
protesters were joined by Chen Shuibian, however as I like to call it, the "March 
in March" did not have a detrimental effect on the P R C s standing with the 
Taiwanese people, and neither has the ASL. 
In a bid to give legitimacy to the claim that the PRC only wants peace with 
Taiwan and that the Anti-Secession Law is only aimed at deterring pro-
independence activists, Beijing invited the K M T party leader at the time and 
former presidential candidate Lian Zhan to come to China and meet with 
government officials. They also invited the leader of the People's First Party 
(PFP), also a former presidential and vice-presidential candidate, James Soong. I 
will discuss exactly how these visits came about and the effects and possible 
effects they have had on Cross-Strait relations. I will return to the K M T and PFP 
Mainland visits shortly. 
128 Stephan Grauwels. "Taiwan Protests Anti-Secession Law." March 26, 2005. 
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Another important reaction to note, was the reaction of the US to the Anti-
Secession Law. Because Taiwanese security is of concern to the US, the law was 
not welcomed by the Bush administration. During a visit to Beijing in late March 
2005 Condoleezza Rice, the Secretary of State for the Bush Administration 
informed the Chinese government that while the US supports a "one China" 
policy, the US does have obligations to Taiwan as described in the Taiwan 
Relations Act, and expressed her feeling that the Anti-Secession Law would 
create tensions in Taiwan Strait. The White House described the law as 
" i i n h e l p f u l " i 2 9 . 
However, besides this rather muted response, the Bush administration did 
not respond to the Anti-Secession Law in the same way the Clinton 
administration responded to the missile exercises in the 90s. Instead of sending 
aircraft carriers or putting any diplomatic pressure on China, the US has focused 
on other aspects of its relationship with China. In fact, in 2005 the US has placed 
its focus more on two other issues. Recently, the US has been very concerned 
about the situation in North Korea. Since the government of the 
DPRK(Democratic People's Republic of Korea) announced that it was restarting 
its nuclear program, the US has constantly sought Chinese help in pressuring 
North Korea to halt its nuclear program. China's help in organizing six party 
talks with North Korea has been instrumental and it is unlikely the US would 
⑵ " U S unease at China's Taiwan Law" BBC News, March 9,2005. 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4331443.stm 
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want conflict over Taiwan to get in the way of halting the North Korean nuclear 
weapons development. 
There are two other reasons why I believe the US response to the ASL was 
very mild. Recently, due to mounting pressure in the US, the US government has 
been pressuring China to un-peg its currency to the US dollar. The US has 
applied pressure to the Chinese government in an effort to have the Chinese 
change their currency policy and to take other actions that would help in 
reducing the large trade deficit. The other reason why the US did not have a 
strong reaction to the law is that since September 11,2001(9/11) the US military 
has been occupied fighting the war on terrorism. Since 9/11 the US has launched 
invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and continues to fight in both countries. Over 
100,000 US soldiers are currently stationed in Iraq. The cost of the war on terror 
has been high, both monetarily and politically. In some respects that US military 
is already stretched and occupied in the Middle East, and adding another venue 
would be counterproductive. These factors would make it very unlikely that the 
U S would want to engage in conflict with China at this time. 
It is also very possible that the Anti-Secession law was helpful to the US^^o. 
As a reaction to the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident, Europe has had an 
embargo on arms sales to the P R C In recent years the PRC has strenuously 
lobbied to have this embargo lifted. It has referred to the embargo as "political 
130 Ralph A. Cossa. "Anti-Secession Law, Closing (Or Opening) the door?" Pacific 
Forum CSIS. Honolulu, Hawaii March 2005. 
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discrimination". The PRC has also offered economic incentives to some 
European countries to encourage them to lift the embargo. The possibility of 
lifting the embargo has been strongly opposed by the US. The US feels it would 
be improper for its allies in Europe to sell weapons to China while China's 
human rights record is still dubious, and while it continues to threaten Taiwan. 
Additionally, the US feels that lifting the arms embargo will adversely change 
the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait.i^ i However, despite American 
reservations, the European Union seemed set on lifting the arms embargo. They 
intended to replace the embargo with certain other rules against weapons sales. 
However, the impact of the anti-secession law changed the direction of the 
m o m e n t u m in Europe. European governments, such as France and Germanyi32 
that supported ending the embargo were dealt a setback when China passed the 
law. As China has risen economically and expanded its military, the Chinese 
government has repeatedly attempted to make it clear that its rise is peaceful and 
of no threat to anyone. The passage of the law strengthened the position of those 
that look more skeptically at China's rise. While the US has officially referred to 
the Anti-Secession law as being "unhelpful", it is important to note that in this 
situation the law actually was indirectly helpful toward US interests. In this case, 
the law was a political setback for China. It has tried very hard to get Europe to 
放 Peter Brookes. "The Lifting of the E U Arms Embargo O n China: A n American 
Perspective." March 2, 2005. www.heritage.org 
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lift the embargo, and it is most likely that the Anti-Secession Law will delay it 
from being lifted. 
Despite these US and EU reactions, the Anti-Secession Law has generally 
been in China's favor. Putting aside the protests in Taiwan and an unsuccessful 
attempt by the Taiwan Solidarity Union to pass a bill countering the law, events 
which both occurred shortly after the ASL was passed, China has largely 
achieved its main immediate goals with the ASL. At the end of March, 2005, 
representatives of the K M T visited the Mainland and held talks with officials 
there. The talks focused mostly on economic issues and opening up more links 
between Taiwan and the Mainland. At that meeting it was agreed that in certain 
areas cross-Strait ties should be improved. Among those areas are the possibility 
of having more cross-strait flights, strengthening agricultural cooperation, 
initiatives to help Taiwanese investors in China, help in allowing media from 
both sides to have greater access across the strait, possibly joint crackdowns on 
crimes, and a system of reciprocity where students can study across the strait 
and pay the same school fees.说 Additionally it was at this time that the PRC 
extended an invitation for a later Mainland visit by Lian Zhan. Lian Zhan's visit 
marked the first time the leaders of the K M T and CCP met since the Chinese 
Civil War. "As millions of Taiwanese and Chinese watched on television, 
Chinese President H u Jintao shook hands with the opposition leader at a lavish 
133 "Twelve Results Achieved In CPC and K M T Dialogue." People's Daily, Mar. 31' 
2005. 
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state reception in Beijing. After Lien[Lian] returned to Taipei on May 3, Hu's 
government sweetened its PR offensive with more goodies, including a plan to 
ease restrictions on Chinese travel to Taiwan, lift tariffs on some Taiwanese 
agricultural imports - and [offered to] send two giant pandas to the Taipei Zoo. 
To add even more surprise, Taiwanese President Chen, despite some of his 
supporters' fury at Lien's[Lian's] visit, inserted himself into the dialogue. Chen 
agreed to send a message to Chinese President H u through another opposition 
leader, James Soong of the People First Party, who was scheduled to start a 
China trip on M a y 5〃 i讨Based on the timing of the invitation, China had two 
intentions when inviting the K M T leaders. The first one I have previously noted. 
China wanted to allay Taiwanese fears about the anti-secession law and 
demonstrate that it was sincere about promoting peace in the Taiwan Strait. The 
other objective was to help the K M T gain ground in Taiwan. 
I believe that the law has helped in achieving both goals. Besides the 
period immediately following the passage of the law, the Taiwanese people have 
not taken major action in opposition to it. Furthermore, during local elections in 
December the K M T won a significant victory. The head of the K M T and possible 
presidential hopeful M a Ying Jeou(ciirrently mayor of Taipei) is very popular in 
Taiwan. M a has recently expressed approval of the possibility of improving links 
with the Mainland. H e believes opening up more links as well as resuming 
dialogue with the Mainland will help Taiwan gain initiative in cross-strait 
1 讨 http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content / 05_20 / b3933011.htm 
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relations. "Taiwan's national security must not depend solely on weapons but 
on working toward a cessation of cross-strait hostility through political, cultural 
and artistic means"i35 The local elections that took place could possibly bode 
poorly for the DPP in 2008. Because China has shown its willingness to hold 
negotiations with the K M T and not the DPP it is reasonable to predict that a 
K M T victory could bring the two sides closer. The growth of K M T power will 
help China achieve its goal of opening up more links such as tourism and 
investment across the strait. This situation is especially significant in light of the 
fact that the DPP has decided to take a tougher stance toward the Mainland. A 
tougher stance is likely to appeal to its traditional support base. In his N e w 
Years(2006) Day Speech, Chen Shuibian announced his intention to hold a 
constitutional referendum before his term expires in 2008. Although some 
members of the DPP have announced that Chen will stick to his previous 
commitment and stay away from the independence/ unification issue by-
avoiding issues such as a possible name change, Beijing has typically been 
skeptical of his actions. 
In February 2006, Chen made a decision that angered the leaders in 
Beijing as well as Washington. Chen decided to terminate Taiwan's National 
Unification Coiincil.i36The council, which had existed since 1990137, was virtually 
135 Y.F. LOW, "Taiwan Needs to Resume Talks With China to get Initiative: KMT" 
December 28^ 2005 http://taiwansecurity.org/CNA/2005/CNA-281205-l.htm 
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inoperative during Chen's tenure. However, its very existence had symbolic 
meaning. The fact that Chen had decided to do away with the council was 
viewed by Beijing as a possible step toward independence. However, according 
to some analysts, Chen's move is a response to the defeat his party suffered in 
the December 2005 elections. With Chen's popularity ratings down, this move 
m a y help him rally his support base in the Pan-Green (泛綠）Camp. 
The move to eliminate the National Unification Council is arguably a 
violation of the "five noes" promise made by Chen in his inaugural speech. 
According to a K M T spokesperson, "The 'five noes' policy is the most important 
foundation for maintaining the status quo.. .Terminating the national unification 
guidelines puts the other 'four noes' promises on the brink of collapse". 
Furthermore, the spokesperson mentioned that K M T chairman and Taipei Mayor 
M a Ying Jeou intends to take steps to recall President Chen.^^® M a belives that 
this step is damaging to the status quo, which he is in support of maintaining. In 
Ma's opinion, unification is the ultimate goal, however the present time is not the 
best time to pursue unification, therefore the status quo is optimal. Chen's 
decision also drew harsh remarks from the opposition PFP. Lu Hsueh-Chang, the 
head of the PFP legislative caucus said "Chen Shui-Bian has terminated the 
[council] and its guidelines, provoked an ethnic rift, hurt mutual trust between 
137 "China Warns Taiwan of N e w Crisis" February 28〜2006, from CNN.com 
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Taiwan and the US, and sabotaged Taiwan's international reputation. What he 
has done is actually an act of subversion". These comments were made in order 
to justify the PFFs intention to call for the impeachment of Chen.^39 Chen's 
actions have drawn the ire of the PRC as welU如 
What effect Chen's actions here will have is not known yet. O n one hand, 
it may harm his standing and strengthen the position of the K M T ahead of the 
2008 election. O n the other hand it could have the effect of rousing Chen's 
supporters and boosting his popularity. In m y opinion, the anti-secession law 
along with the olive branch sent out to the K M T by the PRC has backed Chen 
into a comer. He cannot negotiate with China because that would require him to 
accept the one-China policy laid out in the Singapore agreement. The K M T 
currently holds a majority legislature, and with the unpopularity of Chen, the 
forces that have been involved in the talks with the Mainland would seem like 
they are in a better position than the forces seeking independence. 
139 "Chen Faces Impeachment Bid Over Scrapping of Council" Thursday March 
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C h a p t e r E i g h t : C o n c l u s i o n 
In this thesis I have made the argument that the ASL was created with 
certain objectives in mind. These objectives were to warn Taiwan about the 
dangers of declaring independence while at the same time not causing popular 
anti-China sentiment, prove H u Jintao had enough proper "Taiwan credentials" 
to be China's leader, to isolate Chen Shuibian, to deter Taiwan from declaring 
independence, and to set the tone for future cross-strait relations. I have also 
argued that the ASL cannot simply be looked at as a solitary gesture. It must be 
interpreted as one element of China's new cross-strait strategy. 
According to Chen-Yuan Tung, during the cross-strait crises of 1995-1996 
and 1999-2000 China had four objectives. The PRC wanted to express its 
disapproval of Taiwan's policies, coerce Taiwanese leaders into re-acceptance of 
the One-China policy, deter Taiwan from formally declaring independence, and 
to discourage the Taiwanese electorate from voting for pro-independence 
candidates. Taiwan has not formally declared independence (Since China is still 
trying to deter independence it is assumed that Taiwan's actions have not 
constituted what Beijing views as a formal declaration of independence), and 
Beijing's actions certainly were successful in displaying its disapproval of 
Taiwan's actions. However, Beijing's actions in the 1990s were unsuccessful in 
getting Taipei to re-adopt the One-China principle, and the Taiwanese electorate 
has since voted in a pro-independence Presidential candidate twice and has since 
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voted in Pan-Green majority legislatures. In order to accomplish its objectives, 
Beijing needed a new strategy. Since the ASL was immediately followed by an 
"olive branch" to the Taiwanese, the Chinese have decided that they could no 
longer sit by and allow the DPP to keep winning elections in Taiwan while they 
refuse to accept the "one China" principle. As the "one China" principle has not 
been accepted by the DPP, w e can infer that the invitations to the Mainland are 
only really meant for the opposition Pan-Blue (泛濫)Camp. 
In m y literature review I discussed Stephane Dion's theory about 
secession in democracies. I believe his theory can be properly applied to the 
current Beijing strategy. The ASL has shown that the risks associated with 
independence can be too high for the Taiwanese. Since most Taiwanese do not 
want independence at the cost of war, by making the cost of independence war, 
China can effectively remove the desire for independence. O n the other hand, 
China continues to offer Taiwan incentives to accept the One-China Principle. 
Incentives have ranged from the recent offer of Pandas to Taiwan to possible 
agricultural benefits. Additionally the Mainland has brought up the possibility of 
allowing Chinese tourists to vacation in Taiwan. Some of these moves could 
benefit the Taiwanese economy. Basically, Beijing has shown that the cost of 
independence is high, and while their immediate goal is not necessarily 
unification, they are trying to boost the Taiwanese people's confidence in 
accepting the One-China Principle. 
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I have shown that Chen Shuibian would have been the Condorcet loser in 
the 2000 Taiwanese election. Additionally in the 2004 Taiwanese election Chen 
won a very close race. Most analysts agree that under normal circumstances 
Chen would not have won the 2004 election. However, unknown assailants 
attempted to assassinate Chen and his running mate Vice-President Annette Lu 
just before the election. The assassination attempt gave him a necesary boost. 
Since Chen's administration is currently unpopular and his party has suffered in 
the most recent Taiwan elections and the K M T candidate M a Ying-jeou is very 
popular it would seem that the K M T is in a strong position two years before the 
2008 election. A K M T victory could very well signify a new era in cross-strait 
relations. 
I believe that based on the continuing visits by K M T leaders to Mainland 
China, China's new strategy of dealing with Taiwan has already had a great 
impact on the course of events in the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan's economy has not 
been as strong this decade as it has been in previous decades. It has not enjoyed 
its former high rates of economic growth.i4iThe fact that the economy has slowed 
down may make the prospect of improving business links with China more 
desirable to Taiwanese people. Since the Pan-Green Camp tends to discourage 
reliance on the Chinese market, their stance may not be in line with the best 
141 F r o m 1 9 5 2 - 2 0 0 1 T a i w a n h a d a n a ve r age e c o n o m i c g r o w t h ra te o f 8 . 1 3 % 
h t t p : / / w w w . g i o . g o v . t w / i n f o / t a i w a n - s t o r v / e c o n o m v / e d o w n / 3 - 5 . h t m D u r i n g 2 0 0 5 - 2 0 0 6 t h e 
g r o w t h r a te w a s e s t i m a t e d a n d p red i c t ed t o b e 3 . 7 % a n d 4 . 1 % respec t i ve l y . 
h t t p : / / w w w . t a i p e i t i m e s . e o m / N e w s / b i z / a r c h i v e s / 2 0 0 5 / l 1 / 1 0 / 2 0 0 3 2 7 9 6 0 4 
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prospects for the Taiwanese economy. People who believe the economy is a 
major priority may end up supporting the K M T because the K M T would be more 
likely to make potentially lucrative deals with the Mainland. 
From this information it can be concluded that despite warnings from 
China against the passage of the ASL, China has in fact accomplished its 
objectives and therefore the ASL could be considered a success. The ASL did not 
remove Chen's desire to alter Taiwan's constitution, but at the very least Beijing 
has taken action regarding Taiwan. Basically, China could not sit by while in its 
view Taiwan was moving closer to independence. China did manage to take 
action without hurting its interests in Taiwan. Since the position of the K M T is at 
one of its strongest points since it lost hold of the presidency, and the DPP is 
unpopular the ASL certainly cannot be viewed as having hurt China's interests. 
I have also discussed the fact that the US reaction to the ASL was not 
harsh. During President H u Jintao's visit to the United States in April 2005 the 
Taiwan issue was not a priority discussion for the US government. The concerns 
that have mainly drawn attention in the Sino-US relationship have been 
economically related, but have also been diplomacy and security related. 
The main drawback for China in passing the ASL was likely that it gave 
the U S the help it needed in convincing Europeans not to drop their arms 
embargo. Convincing the Europeans to repeal the arms embargo was one of 
China's political failures in 2005. Due to the fact that France and Germany 
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backed repealing the arms embargo, it is likely that the PRC could attempt to 
have it lifted again and meet with more success. 
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